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INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 2001, Abraham Abdallah, a busboy from
Brooklyn, New York, was arrested for using the Internet at public
libraries to steal the identities of more than 200 of the wealthiest
business moguls in the United States, including Steven Spielberg,
1
Oprah Winfrey and Ted Turner. After acquiring the celebrities’
social security numbers, credit reports, account numbers and
addresses, Abdallah accessed their credit card and investment
accounts and made an estimated $100 million worth of purchases on
2
the Internet. In April 2001, a California court sentenced a man to
200 years to life in prison for using the identity of Tiger Woods to buy
3
$17,000 worth of goods, including a television and a luxury car. On
June 5, 2001, after a request from the Governor, the Florida Supreme
Court issued an order to impanel a grand jury to investigate the
4
growing problem of identity theft. Currently, numerous legislative
bills addressing the privacy of personal data are pending in the U.S.
5
Congress. Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court decided its first case
6
involving identity theft in November 2001.
These legislative and judicial responses reflect the growing national
7
concern over privacy of personal information and identity theft.
1. See Murray Weiss, How NYPD Cracked the Ultimate Cyberfraud-B’klyn Busboy
Busted in Theft of 200+ Tycoon IDs, N.Y. POST, Mar. 20, 2001, at 4 (reporting that
Abdallah used the Internet, cellular phones, and voice mailboxes to steal identities of
the wealthiest Americans listed in Forbes 400).
2. See id. (explaining that Abdallah’s cybercrime has been considered one of the
largest identity theft cases in Internet history); see also Protecting Privacy and Preventing
Misuse of Social Security Numbers: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., 107th Cong. 60 (2001) [hereinafter Ways and Means Hearings]
(statement of Michael Fabozzi, Detective, New York City Police Department)
(recounting Abdallah’s strategy for stealing identities).
3. See Someone Else Loses to Tiger Woods, CARDFAX, Apr. 30, 2001 (explaining that
Anthony Lemar Taylor, who had been convicted of 20 misdemeanors, was sentenced
under California’s three strikes law), available at 2001 WL 8724954, *1.
4. See Grand Jury Seated to Study Identity Theft, TAMPA TRIB., June 5, 2001, at 2
(explaining that eighteen jurors will be selected to investigate identity theft).
5. See, e.g., Social Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act of
2001, H.R. 2036, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending the Social Security Act to enhance
privacy protections and to prevent fraudulent misuse of social security account
numbers); Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2001, S. 1399, 107th Cong. (2001)
(amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act to develop procedural guidelines for credit
reporting agencies’ handling of discrepancies in a consumer’s account).
6. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (holding that a general
discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations for suits under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act); see also David G. Savage, Court Set for New Term and Novel Issues,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at A37 (explaining that the Supreme Court will examine
the issue of whether the statute of limitations begins when identity theft is committed
or when it is discovered).
7. See 147 CONG. REC. E988 (daily ed. May 25, 2001) (statement of Hon. E. Clay
Shaw, Jr. (Fla.)) (referring to a Wall Street Journal article in which respondents
ranked privacy as their primary concern above war and environmental disasters).
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Identity theft is defined as a crime where “an individual appropriates
another’s name, address, social security number, or other identifying
8
information to commit fraud.” Recently, the U.S. Attorney’s Office
9
recognized identity theft as “the crime of the new millennium.”
Consumer interest groups have called identity theft “one of the
10
Identity theft has
nation’s fastest growing white-collar crimes.”
11
become “a national crisis,” as personal information is becoming
more accessible, and as the above cases illustrate, criminals are
12
becoming more computer literate and technologically savvy.
Identity theft is unique because consumers do not know they have
become victims of identity theft until an application for employment,
a loan, or a mortgage is denied because an imposter has destroyed
their credit reports or has established criminal records in their
13
names. Approximately 500,000 to 700,000 people become victims of
14
identity theft annually. The burden on victims of identity theft is
significant as they face the arduous tasks of reestablishing their credit
15
ratings and their reputations.

8. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act: Hearing on S.J. Res. 512 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info., 105th Cong.
17 (1998) [hereinafter May 20, 1998 Hearings] (statement of David Medine, Associate
Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”)) (presenting the FTC’s views on identity theft).
9. Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, U.S. ATT’YS’ USA
BULL.,
Mar.
2001,
1,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/
criminal/cybercrime/usamarch2001_3.htm (last visited May 29, 2001).
10. Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 118 (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
11. Id. at 16 (statement of Hon. James G. Huse, Jr., Inspector General, Social
Security Administration); see also 147 CONG. REC. E989 (daily ed. May 25, 2001)
(statement of Hon. E. Clay Shaw, Jr.) (reporting that allegations of fraudulent use of
social security numbers increased nearly fifty percent between 1999-2000).
12. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 11 (statement of James Bauer,
Deputy Assistant Director, U.S. Secret Service) (stating that the Internet has led to an
increase in identity fraud); see also Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Identity Thieves Thrive in
Information Age: Rise of Online Data Brokers Makes Criminal Impersonation Easier, WASH.
POST, May 31, 2001, at A1 (reporting that identity thieves are now using personal
information from commercial online data brokers, which collect and sell the data for
a fee).
13. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 19 (statement of David Medine,
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating
that the harm resulting from identity theft “may not be readily apparent or easily
quantifiable”).
14. 147 CONG. REC. S6129 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Jim
Bunning); see 147 CONG. REC. S4591 (daily ed. May 9, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein) (stating that the FBI estimates that 350,000 cases of identity theft
occur each year); O’Harrow, supra note 12, at A9 (citing that the Federal Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency estimated 500,000 victims of identity theft per year).
15. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 20 (statement of David Medine,
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC)
(explaining the time-consuming process of clearing a fraudulent credit report).
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This Comment will explore the relationship between the victims of
16
identity theft and the credit reporting agencies. It will argue that
both recent interpretation of the statutory language of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and credit reporting agencies’ inefficient
17
procedures make a victim’s recovery process almost impossible. Part
I will describe the two main types of identity theft. Part II will
examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in TRW Inc. v.
18
Andrews, which held that the statute of limitations for an action
against a credit reporting agency begins at the time of the initial
violation of the FCRA, rather than when the victim discovers the
19
injury. Part III will address the statutory and procedural barriers
that hinder rapid remediation for the identity theft victim. It will
further assert that the procedural inefficiencies created by the credit
industry, as well as the statutory burden the Supreme Court
condoned in its recent decision, only make a victim’s recovery
process more difficult.
Part IV will survey federal agency responses to the identity theft
crisis. Specifically, this Part will examine the mechanisms the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) has established to fulfill its obligations
under the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act and the
strides the FTC program has made in educating consumers, reducing
the burdens on victims, and preventing identity theft. Finally, Part V
will address the voluntary initiatives and legislative proposals that
could make a real impact on the identity theft victim’s recovery
process. In light of the spreading identity theft epidemic, it will
conclude that Congress should look with increased vigor at the role
of the credit reporting agencies in the identity theft crisis.
I.

THE NATURE OF IDENTITY THEFT

Identity theft affects victims in two principle realms—the financial
20
realm and the criminal realm. The misappropriation of another’s
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2000) (defining a consumer reporting agency as a
person who participates in “the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties”).
17. See Erika Morphy, New Privacy Laws, Please, But Not for E-Tailers, ECOMMERCE
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001 (explaining that the statute of limitations issue is only one
barrier to consumers who want to maintain good credit, the other issue being the
burden on the victim of identity theft to clear an erroneous credit report), available
at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/14244.html (last visited Aug. 1,
2002).
18. 534 U.S. 19 (2001).
19. See id. at 28 (imposing a substantial burden on victims of identity theft and
holding that the language of the FCRA precludes implication of a discovery rule).
20. See Identity Theft: How to Protect and Restore Your Good Name: Hearing Before the
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personal information can ruin one’s financial history and can create
21
Whether an imposter
a criminal record in the victim’s name.
22
obtains another’s personal identification information by “low tech”
23
24
methods, more sophisticated means, or even from the Internet, the
25
effect on the victim’s credit and reputation can be devastating.
The most common misappropriation of another’s personal
26
identifiers is financial identity theft, which can occur in many forms.
In an “account takeover,” the criminal accesses the victim’s existing
27
credit card account to make unauthorized charges. The thief often
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info., 106th Cong.
32 (2000) [hereinafter July 12, 2000 Hearings] (statement of Beth Givens, Director,
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (explaining that identity theft can be financial or
criminal in nature).
21. Id.; see generally Brandon McKelvey, Comment, Financial Institutions’ Duty of
Confidentiality to Keep Customer’s Personal Information Secure from the Threat of Identity
Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1077, 1082-88 (2001) (providing an overview of the
various types of identity theft and its impact on consumers).
22. See Identity Theft: Is There Another You?: Joint Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot. and Subcomm. on Fin. and
Hazardous Materials, 106th Cong. 18 (1999) [hereinafter April 22, 1999 Hearings]
(statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC)
(discussing low tech methods of identity theft, such as rummaging through trash for
bank statements or discarded credit card offers); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra
note 20, at 33 (statement of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse)
(explaining that “the old fashioned way” of obtaining personal information is to steal
a purse or wallet and either personally use the information or provide the contents
to a crime ring).
23. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 33 (statement of Beth Givens,
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (describing a method called “the inside job”
in which an employee who has access to client information steals their identities); see
also April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 19 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (defining “skimming” as the act of
copying information on a magnetic strip of an ATM or credit card and re-encoding it
onto another card, transforming a blank card into one identical to that of the
victim).
24. See ID Theft: When Bad Things Happen to your Good Name: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info., 106th Cong.
32 (2000) [hereinafter March 7, 2000 Hearings] (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that “[t]he Internet has
dramatically altered the potential impact of identity theft”); see also id. at 23-24
(statement of Gregory Regan, Special Agent in Charge, Financial Crimes Division,
U.S. Secret Service) (explaining that the Internet increases identity theft because it
creates a “faceless society” and “provides the anonymity that criminals desire”).
25. See, e.g., July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 24 (statement of Michelle
Brown, victim) (describing the trauma she experienced with financial and criminal
identity theft); see also 147 CONG. REC. E1030 (daily ed. June 6, 2001) (statement of
Hon. Darlene Hooley) (explaining a case in which someone stole the identity of a
child who died and was claiming him as a dependent on their income tax return).
26. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 18 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that “[i]dentity theft almost
always involves a financial services institution,” but may take on a variety of forms
such as taking out loans, writing fraudulent checks, or opening a bank account in
another’s name).
27. See id. (describing one of the many types of identity theft); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCT. OFFICE, No. GAO/GGD-98-100BR, IDENTITY FRAUD: INFORMATION ON
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reports a change of address to the credit card company to avoid
28
In “true person fraud,” the criminal
discovery by the victim.
assumes another’s complete identity and applies for new credit in the
29
victim’s name.
When credit card bills are not paid, the debt is
30
reported on the victim’s credit report. The victim is usually not
aware of the theft until, for example, a loan application is denied due
31
to a poor credit history.
In March 2001, the FTC reported that opening new accounts and
making unauthorized charges to existing accounts on credit cards or
32
utilities were the most common identity theft cases. The FTC also
reported that approximately fifty percent of victims experience
33
multiple types of identity theft, including the criminal obtaining
loans and mortgages, transferring money from bank accounts, and
34
writing fraudulent checks using the victim’s identity.

PREVALENCE, COST, AND INTERNET IMPACT IS LIMITED 18 (May 1998) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT] (identifying three types of financial identity theft addressed in different
sections of the U.S. Code).
28. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 18 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (describing the strategy used by the
thief to execute an account takeover).
29. See GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 18 (defining true person fraud and
distinguishing it from other forms of fraud); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note
20, at 34 (statement of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse)
(explaining that identity thieves can also gain employment in the victim’s name).
30. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 32 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that consumers credit
history is usually scarred).
31. See id. (stating that consumers may be denied mortgages, loans, new bank
accounts, and even employment due to the identity thief’s activities).
32. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT COMPLAINT DATA: FIGURES
AND TRENDS ON IDENTITY THEFT NOVEMBER 1999 THROUGH MARCH 2001 2 (2001)
[hereinafter MARCH 2001 DATA] (stating forty-seven percent of victims who contacted
the FTC reported credit card fraud and twenty-two percent reported fraudulent
utility service).
33. See id. at 3 (reporting that half of the victims experience a combination of
identity theft, whether it be both credit card fraud and bank fraud, or the creation of
new utility accounts and personal loans).
34. See id. at 2 (showing that fifteen percent of victims reported that identity
thieves wrote fraudulent checks, made unauthorized bank withdrawals, and
established new bank accounts, and eight percent reported that thieves had obtained
fraudulent loans); see also May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 19 (statement of
David Medine, Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
FTC) (explaining that criminals usually seek out consumers with high incomes and
good credit).
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Criminal identity theft, termed “the worst case scenario,” affects
36
In criminal
approximately eleven percent of consumer victims.
identity theft, the criminal gives the victim’s personal identifying
information to a law enforcement officer upon arrest or issuance of a
37
citation. When the imposter does not appear in court, a warrant for
38
arrest will be issued in the victim’s name. The victim often will find
out about the crime committed in his or her name only when he or
she commits a traffic violation and a law enforcement officer runs a
39
background check. A victim may also become aware of the identity
theft when denied employment after the employer conducts a
40
background investigation revealing the imposter’s criminal conduct.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES IDENTITY THEFT
The Supreme Court recently heard the story of Adelaide Andrews,
41
a classic case of financial identity theft. The Supreme Court’s 9-0
decision has highlighted one obstacle that a victim faces in
42
recovering from identity theft. In Andrews’ case, the Court held
35. July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 34 (statement of Beth Givens,
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse); see PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, FACT
SHEET 17(G), CRIMINAL IDENTITY THEFT WHAT TO DO IF IT HAPPENS TO YOU
[hereinafter FACT SHEET 17(G)](defining criminal identity theft and explaining what
to do if you are a victim), at www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs17g-CrimIdTheft.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2002).
36. See FTC, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM ASSISTANCE WORKSHOP 16 (Oct. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP] (remarks of Joanna Crane, Attorney,
Division of Planning and Information, FTC) (explaining prevalence of criminal
identity theft).
37. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 24 (statement of Michelle Brown,
victim) (recounting her experience when she received a prison sentence because an
imposter gave her information to the DEA and a federal judge when the imposter
was caught trafficking marijuana); see also FACT SHEET 17(G), supra note 35 (stating
that criminal identity theft can happen through use of a counterfeit driver’s license
containing another’s information).
38. See FACT SHEET 17(G), supra note 35 (outlining the techniques criminal
identity thieves use); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 34 (statement of
Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (citing a case in which a victim
was returning to the United States from Mexico and was put in jail for ten days when
a search revealed he was wanted for a crime, which in fact was perpetrated by an
imposter).
39. See FACT SHEET 17(G), supra note 35 (explaining that the victim may be
arrested and taken to jail because of an outstanding warrant in his or her name).
40. See id. (noting that an employer is legally obligated to inform the victim of
the reason for rejection, which puts the victim on alert).
41. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23 (2001) (reporting that Adelaide
Andrews’ personal information was stolen by a receptionist at her radiologist’s office
and was used to open various credit accounts).
42. See id. at 21 (stating that seven justices joined the majority opinion and two
justices filed an opinion concurring in the judgment); see also Identity Theft: Special
Report, CONSUMER REPS., Sept. 1997, at 10 (describing that suing credit reporting
agencies for improper disclosures is a new avenue of recourse for identity theft
victims).
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that the statute of limitations for a suit against a credit reporting
agency for improper disclosures begins at the time of the initial
violation of the FCRA, not when the victim discovers that an
43
improper disclosure occurred. As a result of this decision, victims
will lose their opportunity to file a claim against a credit reporting
agency for improper disclosures if they learn of the occurrence of a
violation at any time after the two-year statute of limitations has
44
expired.
A. Facts
Adelaide Andrews’ ordeal with identity theft began at a doctor’s
45
visit on June 17, 1993. At that visit, Andrews completed a Patient
Information form, which included, among other standard
information, her name, social security number, home address,
46
driver’s license number, and date of birth. The receptionist, Andrea
Andrews (the “Imposter”), copied Adelaide Andrews’ personal
47
information and subsequently relocated to Las Vegas, Nevada. After
moving to Las Vegas, the Imposter used Andrews’ personal
information to rent an apartment and to establish telephone and
48
electric service.
The Imposter then attempted to obtain services from five
49
creditors, which subscribed to two different credit reporting
50
agencies. On October 22, 1994, the Imposter applied for a credit
account at Dillard’s department store, using her own name, her Las
Vegas address, and Andrews’ social security number on the
43. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 22-23 (holding that a discovery rule, in which the statute
of limitations would begin to run at the time of the plaintiff’s discovery of the
violation, does not apply to cases under the FCRA).
44. See Borrowers Beware, N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Dec. 3, 2001, at 6 (reporting
that a consumer, who does not request a credit report every two years, risks losing the
opportunity to sue the credit reporting agency for damages from improper
disclosures).
45. Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000)
rev’d 534 U.S. 19 (2001).
46. Id.
47. See id. (recounting the Imposter’s technique).
48. See id. (explaining how the Imposter used the name “Adelaide (Andrea)
Andrews” on her apartment lease application and noting that credit reports were not
requested for the Imposter’s apartment lease, telephone, and utility service
applications).
49. See id. (indicating that the basis of Andrews’ suit against the credit reporting
agency arises from these five attempts by the Imposter to secure lines of credit using
Andrews’ personal information).
50. See id. at 1062 (explaining that when a consumer applies for credit, the credit
grantor will obtain reports from a credit reporting agency to assess the customer’s
credit and to determine whether the grantor should approve the application for
credit).
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51

application. Dillard’s obtained its credit reports from Trans Union
52
Corporation, the defendant in Andrews’ original action. When the
Imposter’s first initial, last name, and social security number matched
those on the credit report file, Trans Union provided the credit
53
report to Dillard’s.
Dillard’s then approved the Imposter’s
application for a line of credit and the account later became
54
delinquent.
55
TRW Inc. (“TRW”), the credit reporting agency implicated in
Andrews’ case in the Supreme Court, was the agency used by four
56
other creditors to whom the Imposter applied for a line of credit.
On July 25, 1994, the Imposter used Andrews’ birth date and social
security number on an application to First Consumers National Bank
57
(“FCNB”).
On September 27, 1994, the Imposter applied for a
credit account from Prime Cable of Las Vegas, for which she used
58
On October 28, 1994, the
Andrews’ social security number.
Imposter submitted an application to Express Department Stores,
using her own identifying information but misappropriating
59
Andrews’ social security number.
Finally, in January 1995, the
Imposter applied for credit from a retail lender, using her own
identity but employing Andrews’ social security number and a
60
misspelling of Andrews’ first name.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. (noting that the Trans Union database showed one file on Andrea
Andrews, the Imposter, and two files on Adelaide Andrews, the plaintiff). The
Imposter’s file listed the Las Vegas address, but no social security number, and
Andrews’ two files showed her Santa Monica address and a previous address in Texas.
Id. Although differences in the files existed, Trans Union provided all three reports
to Dillard’s because the social security number, last name, and first initial matched.
Id. Trans Union, however, did include a “Trans Alert” warning to notify Dillard’s of
the differing addresses. Id.
54. See id. (citing one instance of harm caused by the Imposter).
55. See Experian, Ask Max (Apr. 23, 1997) (noting that TRW, Inc. had formerly
been one of three national credit bureaus, but Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
later assumed control over its business), available at http://www.experian.com/
corporate/max/max042397.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2002).
56. See Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(stating that TRW, Inc. provided credit reports in the four other circumstances in
which the Imposter attempted to obtain services and credit).
57. Id.; see Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing
details of the Imposter’s attempt to gain credit from FCNB, for which she used her
own name, but Adelaide’s date of birth and social security number).
58. See Respondent’s Brief at 5, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (No.
00-1045) (reciting yet another attempt by the Imposter to use Andrews’ identity to
open a new line of credit).
59. Andrews, 225 F.3d at 1065.
60. See id. (stating that the Imposter used her own information to apply for credit
from Commercial Credit, except she used Andrews’ social security number and
misspelled Adelaide Andrews’ first name as “Adeliade”).
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TRW furnished Andrews’ credit reports to each creditor after the
first initial, last name, and social security number on the credit
applications matched the information contained in TRW’s credit
61
reports. Of those applications, only the cable company accepted the
62
Imposter’s request for a line of credit. Although the Imposter paid
the cable company’s minimum payment for a number of months,
63
eventually she let the account become delinquent.
The cable
64
account was sent to a collection agency, which pursued Andrews.
Andrews became aware of the identity theft on May 31, 1995, when
65
she inquired about refinancing the mortgage on her home. The
loan officer obtained a credit report that showed the fraudulent
66
inquiries made on Andrews’ accounts at both TRW and Trans
Union, including a notation that Andrews’ had defaulted on her
67
credit account with Dillard’s department store. As a result of the
delinquent account listing on her credit report, Andrews was denied
68
the loan refinancing terms that she desired. Afterwards, Andrews
experienced emotions common to identity theft victims: she was
“shocked and humiliated by the allegation that she was neither
69
creditworthy nor truthful about her financial dealings.”

61. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 24 (2001) (explaining that when the
TRW computers registered a match, Andrews’ file was provided to the requester); see
also Andrews, 225 F.3d at 1065 (declaring that TRW treated the Imposter’s credit
inquiries as if made by Adelaide Andrews).
62. TRW, 534 U.S. at 24.
63. Respondent’s Brief at 5, TRW (No. 00-1045); see also Brief of Amici Curiae the
Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 9, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that
paying the minimum balance on fraudulent credit lines is one technique identity
thieves use to avoid discovery).
64. Andrews, 225 F.3d at 1065.
65. See Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(explaining that Andrews discovered the identity theft when she spoke to a loan
officer at Home Savings of America).
66. See CALPIRG/PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, NOWHERE TO TURN: VICTIMS
SPEAK OUT ON IDENTITY THEFT 12 (May 2000) [hereinafter NOWHERE TO TURN]
(explaining that credit bureaus record every inquiry into a consumer’s account, even
if the application for credit is ultimately denied), available at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft2000.htm (last visited July 21, 2002).
Therefore, the imposter’s fraudulent applications for credit were listed on Andrews’
credit report.
67. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (detailing the facts of Andrews’ loan
inquiry in which Home Savings of America obtained a credit report for Andrews that
reflected the Imposter’s activities).
68. See id. (explaining that Andrews abandoned the loan application she filed at
Home Savings of America and obtained financing from Merrill Lynch at a higher
interest rate); see also Respondent’s Brief at 6, TRW (No. 00-1045) (discussing the fact
that Home Savings of America denied Andrews’ loan application because of recent
negative credit history).
69. Respondent’s Brief at 6, TRW (No. 00-1045).
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Although TRW corrected her file, the violation of privacy still
72
haunted Andrews for a year after it was discovered. The collection
agency continued to pursue her, and she was denied credit once
again due to the misinformation contained in the TRW credit
73
report. Andrews also alleged that TRW’s breach of privacy led to
emotional distress and exacerbated a pre-existing chronic medical
74
condition.
B. The Lower Courts’ Analyses
Andrews brought suit against TRW and Trans Union Corp. on
75
October 21, 1996, alleging violations of the FCRA. The FCRA was
enacted to balance the competing interests of the credit reporting
76
industry and consumers. While providing credit is essential to the
health of the economy, consumers are concerned with maintaining
77
the accuracy and privacy of their credit histories.
The FCRA
reconciles these goals by requiring credit reporting agencies to adopt
78
and maintain reasonable procedures to ensure accuracy and privacy.
70. See id. at 6-7 (implying that TRW’s attempts to clear Andrews’ credit file
proved insufficient); Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (explaining that Trans Union’s
credit report continued to show the fraudulent Dillard’s inquiry and stating that
Andrews filed an inadequate reinvestigation claim only against Trans Union, and not
against TRW).
71. One of the purposes of the FCRA is “to insure that consumer reporting
agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality and a respect
for consumer’s right to privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4). When a consumer
reporting agency discloses a consumer’s information in violation of a provision of the
FCRA (i.e. disclosing information for an impermissible purpose), it is a violation of
that consumer’s privacy.
72. See Respondent’s Brief at 7, TRW (No. 00-1045) (stating that Andrews was
“vexed throughout the next year by resurgent problems springing from TRW’s and
Trans Union Corporation’s lax consumer reporting procedures”).
73. See id. (describing how TRW “purported[ly]” took procedures to correct her
files, but insisting that a collection agency continually “hounded” her and that
Andrews was “confronted with resurgent misinformation”). For example, the
resurgent misinformation contained in Andrews’ TRW credit report complicated her
application for credit when she changed residences. Id.
74. See id. (explaining that Andrews experienced anger, frustration, worry, and
mental anguish, such that her rheumatologist testified as to the exacerbation of
Andrews’ chronic pre-existing medical condition).
75. Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-61. In her complaint, Andrews alleged
improper disclosure under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b and 1681e(a), inadequate procedures
to maintain accuracy under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), improper reinvestigation by Trans
Union in derogation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a), and violation of California’s Unfair
Trade Practices Act. Id. See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601,
1681-1681u (2000) (outlining the obligations of credit reporting agencies).
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)-(4) (outlining congressional findings that
although credit reporting agencies are important to maintaining public confidence
in the banking system, they also must respect consumer privacy).
77. See id. (stating that inaccuracies would undermine public confidence in the
banking system).
78. See id. § 1681(b) (requiring credit reporting agencies to establish “reasonable

SHOUDT.PRINTER THIS ONE.DOC

350

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/4/2002 1:35 PM

[Vol. 52:339

Towards this end, the FCRA authorizes disclosure of consumer
79
reports only for certain limited and permissible purposes, requires
parties to notify consumers if adverse action will be taken on the basis
80
of their credit reports, provides consumers with the right to access
81
82
information, and creates a procedure for disputing inaccuracies.
The FCRA also grants a private right of action to consumers but only
for those seeking civil liability damages for willful, knowing, or
83
negligent noncompliance with the FCRA’s provisions.
First, Andrews claimed that TRW and Trans Union violated
84
§ 1681e(a) of the FCRA, which prohibits disclosure of consumer
reports to third parties except for certain enumerated permissible
purposes, such as credit transactions in which the consumer is
85
involved. Andrews alleged that the agencies did not supply credit
reports for a permissible purpose because there was no reasonable
86
belief that she was the consumer “involved” in the transactions.
Second, Andrews claimed that the agencies violated § 1681e(b) of the
87
FCRA, which requires credit reporting agencies to “follow
procedures” that promote and ensure accuracy, confidentiality, and proper
utilization of the credit information received while at the same time remaining “fair
and equitable” to the consumer); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 73
(statement of Stuart Pratt, Vice President of Government Relations, Associated
Credit Bureau) (providing an overview of the purposes and uses of the FCRA).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (enumerating the permissible purposes for which a
credit report can be disclosed, including credit transactions involving the consumer,
employment purposes, and underwriting of insurance).
80. See id. § 1681m (attempting to safeguard consumers by imposing certain
duties on persons who utilize information contained in credit reports).
81. See id. § 1681g(a)(1) (setting forth requirements that every consumer
reporting agency shall “clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer . . . [a]ll
information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request”).
82. See id. § 1681i (detailing procedures to be taken in the event of a “disputed
accuracy”).
83. See id. §§ 1681n-o (allowing a private right of action for noncompliance); see
also id. § 1681h(e) (limiting liability of credit reporting agencies, among others,
unless the allegation involves willful, knowing, or negligent noncompliance under 15
U.S.C. § 1681n-o).
84. Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (providing that “[n]o consumer reporting agency
may furnish a consumer report to any person if it has reasonable grounds for
believing that the consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in section
1681b of this title.”). Section 1681b authorizes certain limited conditions and
circumstances under which a consumer’s credit report may be produced to a third
party, including the allowance that a credit reporting agency may furnish a consumer
report “to a person which it has reason to believe . . . intends to use the information
in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the
information is to be furnished . . . .” Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).
86. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (alleging that Andrews’ file was not
furnished for a permissible purpose because its disclosure was based on a credit
application by the Imposter).
87. See id. at 1071 (claiming injury under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), which imposes a
higher standard of accuracy on credit reporting agencies than is required by the
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reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
information concerning the individual about whom the report
88
relates.” Trans Union and TRW disclosed Andrews’ credit report to
the five creditors when key identifiers, such as her first name, current
89
address, and date of birth, did not match. She alleged that these
disclosures facilitated her identity theft, and she sought injunctive
relief, punitive damages and compensation for the time, money,
inconvenience, and emotional distress that TRW had allegedly
90
caused.
On the first claim of improper disclosures under § 1681e(a), the
district court granted partial summary judgment for the credit
91
reporting agencies, based on the statute of limitations.
Section
1681p of the FCRA allows an action against a credit reporting agency
to be brought “within two years from the date on which the liability
arises,” unless the defendant has made a material and willful
92
misrepresentation of information. In that event, the two-year statute
of limitations begins when the plaintiff discovers the
93
misrepresentation.
TRW argued that because the first two disclosures to FCNB and
Prime Cable were made more than two years before the suit was filed,
94
those disclosures could not give rise to any liability. Andrews argued
95
that the discovery rule should apply and that the statute of
improper disclosure rule under § 1681e(a)).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
89. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (describing the Imposter’s various credit
inquiries and highlighting the multiple occasions when the Imposter lacked, or
failed to provide, accurate identifying information about the plaintiff, Adelaide
Andrews).
90. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 25 (describing the injuries that Andrews alleged resulted
from the law security at the credit reporting agencies).
91. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 (holding that the claim was barred by
§ 1681p).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.
An action to enforce any liability created under this title may be brought in
any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in
controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within two years
from the date on which the liability arises, except that where a defendant has
materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under this
title to be disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented
is material to the establishment of the defendant’s liability to that individual
under this title, the action may be brought at any time within two years after
discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation.
Id.
93. Id.
94. Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
95. See generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 179 (2000) (defining the
discovery rule as an equitable principle in which a plaintiff’s claim will not accrue
until he or she discovers or should have discovered that they had a cause of action or
until the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered all the elements of the cause
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limitations did not begin until she knew or should have known of the
96
improper disclosures. The district court stated that § 1681p clearly
97
established a two-year statute of limitations, but examined whether §
98
1681p could be read to include an implied discovery rule.
The district court concluded that the plain language of the statute
99
precluded the application of the discovery rule. The court reasoned
that the existence of the exception in § 1681p—applying the
discovery rule when the defendant made a material and willful
misrepresentation—implied that Congress did not intend for the
100
discovery rule to apply to all FCRA cases. It explained that holding
otherwise would depart from decisions in other circuits that have
refused to toll the statute of limitations in FCRA cases until the
101
discovery of the injury. Therefore, Andrews’ claim of improper
disclosure of her credit report to the first two creditors (FCNB and
102
Prime Cable) was time barred.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision
103
that barred Andrews’ claims.
The court recognized Ninth Circuit
precedent that held that, as a general rule, “a federal statute of
limitations begins to run when a party knows or has reason to know
104
that she was injured.”
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the
Ninth Circuit explained that “the equitable doctrine of discovery ‘is
read into every federal statute of limitations’” unless Congress has
105
expressly legislated otherwise.
Finding no such expression from
of action).
96. Andrews, F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. (relying on the premise that “[w]here ‘Congress explicitly enumerates
certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be
implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.’” (quoting Andrus
v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980))).
101. See id. (stating that the Third, Seventh and Tenth Circuits all refused to apply
a general discovery rule to § 1681p (citing Clark v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 54 F.3d
669, 672-73 (10th Cir. 1995); Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th
Cir. 1989); Houghton v. Ins. Crime Prevention Inst., 795 F.2d 322, 325 (3d Cir.
1986))).
102. Id. The district court held that, even though the reports were disclosed to
the Imposter, the remaining disclosures were proper because they were made for
permissible purposes under the FCRA and because TRW had procedures reasonably
designed to prevent impermissible disclosures. Id. at 1068-69. Andrews’ second
claim of inaccuracy was tried by a jury who found for TRW. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19, 24 n.3 (2001). Adelaide Andrews settled her claims with Trans Union;
therefore, they did not proceed.
103. Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 534 U.S. 19
(2001).
104. Id. at 1066 (quoting Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d
1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998)).
105. See id. at 1067 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), in
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Congress, the Ninth Circuit applied a general discovery rule. The
court’s decision was also an attempt to be consistent with an earlier
decision in which the discovery rule was applied to actions under an
107
analogous statute.
Thus, Andrews’ claims against TRW for
108
improper disclosure were reinstated.
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of
whether the statute of limitations in an action against a credit
reporting agency under the FCRA begins when the plaintiff discovers
the violation (the injury discovery rule) or when the violation initially
109
occurs (violation occurrence rule).
Andrews certainly faced an
uphill battle; at least three circuits had already held that a general
discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations in the
110
FCRA.
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
presumption that a discovery rule applies for all federal statute of
111
limitations unless Congress expressly legislates otherwise.
The
Court concluded that congressional intent to deny a general
discovery rule does not need to be explicit, as the Ninth Circuit had
112
held, but can be implied from the text and structure of the statute.

which the discovery rule was applied to a cause of action for fraud, and stating that
the language of the FCRA and decisions of other circuits should yield to this
Supreme Court principle).
106. See id. (holding that Andrews’ claims were not barred).
107. See id. (citing Englerius v. Veterans Admin., 837 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1988),
which interpreted the Privacy Act to include a discovery rule).
108. See id. (finding that none of Andrews’ claims were stale when she brought
suit). The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court holding that TRW’s
disclosures were permissible under the FCRA. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however,
affirmed the district court on the accuracy claim, dismissing her accuracy claim
under § 1681e(b), by finding that TRW had procedures reasonably designed to
prevent impermissible disclosures. Id. at 1068.
109. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 532 U.S. 902 (2001); see TRW 534 U.S. 19, 26 (2001)
(writing that the Court would look at the case to resolve a conflict between the Ninth
Circuit and four other circuits: the Third, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh).
110. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 26 (citing Clark v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 54 F.3d 669,
672-73 (10th Cir. 1995); Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.
1989); Houghton v. Ins. Crime Prevention Inst., 795 F.2d 322, 325 (3d Cir. 1986);
Clay v. Equifax, 762 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir. 1985)).
111. See id. (stating that “beyond doubt, the Court has never endorsed the Ninth
Circuit’s view that Congress can convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule only by
explicit command . . . .”).
112. See id. (stating that the Ninth Circuit erred “in holding that a generally
applied discovery rule control[led the] case”).
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The Court stated that it only recognized an injury discovery rule in
113
certain circumstances. First, the Court has recognized the discovery
114
rule in cases of fraud or concealment. In cases of fraud, the statute
of limitations is tolled until discovery of the injury because the
plaintiff is ignorant of it without any fault or lack of diligence on his
115
part. Second, the Court has applied the discovery rule “where the
116
cry for [such a] rule is loudest.”
For example, in cases of latent
disease or medical malpractice, the Court has implied a discovery
rule, but only where a claim is brought under what it considers
117
“humane” legislation. While noting that lower federal courts have
118
applied the discovery rule when a statute is silent on the issue, the
119
The Court
Supreme Court has refused to follow their lead.
concluded that because the FCRA is not silent on the issue and “does
not govern an area of the law that cries out” for its application, the
120
discovery rule does not apply.
The Supreme Court looked to statutory construction to show that
121
§ 1681p precluded the discovery rule and relied on the principle of
122
The
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius” to support its argument.
Court accepted the petitioner’s and the district court’s argument that
when a statute explicitly enumerates certain exceptions, additional
123
exceptions are not to be implied.
The Court held that “Congress
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)).
115. See id. (explaining that although Holmberg held that equity tolls the statute of
limitations in cases of fraud, it did not “establish a general presumption applicable
across all contexts”).
116. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555
(2000)).
117. See id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to cases of medical malpractice
and latent disease in which the court has recognized the discovery rule because the
“humane” legislation, under which plaintiffs’ claims were brought, could not have
been interpreted as being so unfair to plaintiffs in those circumstances (citing Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949))); see, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000)
(recognizing the injury discovery rule in medical malpractice cases, but refusing to
apply it in a RICO action); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979)
(advocating an injury and causation discovery rule, under the Federal Torts Claims
Act, in which the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows he has
been hurt and can identify the defendant).
118. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 27.
119. See id. (stating that “we have not adopted that position as our own.”).
120. See id. at 28 (suggesting that the FCRA is not silent because § 1681p addresses
the statute of limitations issue, and that the FCRA is not considered humane
legislation).
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the Latin
phrase as a “canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing
implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative”).
123. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 28-29 (explaining that enumerating exceptions indicate
congressional intent to preclude courts from including additional exceptions not
listed); see also Petitioner’s Brief at 21, TRW (No. 00-1045) (advocating a traditional
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implicitly excluded a general discovery rule by explicitly including a
124
more limited one.”
Relying on the text of FCRA § 1681p, the Court explained that
applying a general discovery rule would render the misrepresentation
125
exception “superfluous.”
As the Court explained, in an average
case, the consumer will not discover an improper disclosure until she
126
requests a credit report. If the credit reporting agency conceals the
information, then both the discovery rule and the misrepresentation
127
exception would toll the statute of limitations. When the concealed
disclosure is discovered, the statute of limitations would begin to run
128
under either rule.
According to a hallmark of statutory
interpretation, no word in a statute shall be superfluous, unless it
129
cannot be prevente.
Because the Court found that applying a
general discovery rule would make the misrepresentation exception
meaningless, it refused to extend the discovery rule beyond cases of
130
misrepresentation or concealment.
Finally, the Court examined the legislative history of the statute of
limitations in the FCRA and reaffirmed its conclusion that Congress
131
did not intend to apply a general discovery rule to the FCRA.
Andrews argued that initial drafts of the FCRA had expressly
included language that tolled the statute of limitations until the “date
132
of the occurrence of the violation.”
Because that language was
replaced with the “liability arises” language, Andrews argued that
Congress did not intend for the statute of limitations to begin when
133
the violation occurred. This argument did not persuade the Court
because the legislative history also showed that lawmakers rejected
testimony that encouraged them to begin the running of the statute
134
of limitations when the violation was discovered.
In addition, the
commencement rule because the only exceptions Congress intended are expressly
stated).
124. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 28 (stating that reading the exception into the rule
would distort the statute’s text by turning the exception into the rule).
125. Id. at 29.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 31 (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 32-33.
132. Id. at 32; see also Respondent’s Brief at 26, TRW (No. 00-1045) (suggesting
that initial drafts of the FCRA would have expressly applied a violation occurrence
rule).
133. See Respondent’s Brief at 28, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the final
version’s lack of violation occurrence language is evidence of the congressional
intent “to choose a more accommodating type of statute of limitations”).
134. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 33 (explaining that the legislative history is not
dispositive).
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Court noted that the misrepresentation exception was adopted at the
135
The
same time the “date of occurrence” language was deleted.
Court explained that it was doubtful that Congress would create an
136
exception and adopt a general discovery rule simultaneously.
This Supreme Court decision is devastating for identity theft
137
The Court’s
victims as well as consumer protection advocates.
interpretation of the statutory language creates a significant burden
138
on the victim of identity theft.
Running the statute of limitations
from the time of the initial FCRA violation forces victims to bear
139
significant losses.
III. THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE CREDIT INDUSTRY CREATE BURDENS
ON IDENTITY THEFT VICTIMS
Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, the prevalence of identity
theft, the disastrous effects it has on victims and its connection to the
credit reporting agencies, are evidence that the FCRA does cover an
140
area of the law that “cries out” for application of the discovery rule.
In 1997, actual losses from identity theft to victims and financial
141
institutions totaled $745 million.
This figure, however, does not
reflect the “human costs” suffered by the victims of identity theft, as
142
While a victim of consumer
cases like Adelaide Andrews’ reflect.
identity theft will not be held liable for the debts incurred by identity
143
thieves, they bear the burden of regaining their financial health
144
and restoring their credit history. A study of sixty-six identity theft
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (objecting to Congress and the
judiciary’s decision to limit the discovery rule to cases of misrepresentation).
138. See id. (explaining that victims could be barred from bringing an action to
enforce the FCRA provisions if they do not review credit reports every two years).
139. See id. (arguing that the judiciary’s reliance on statutory construction is
understandable but that Congress should reexamine its position because victims will
lose their opportunity to recover damages for improper disclosures).
140. See id. (calling for Congress to consider the needs of victims of identity theft
when applying a statute of limitations to the FCRA).
141. GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 1.
142. See id. at 22 (explaining that emotional, financial, and opportunity costs can
be substantial and that identity theft victims report feeling “violated”); see also
NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 4 (explaining that stress, emotional trauma,
time lost, and damaged credit reputation, not the financial aspect of the fraud, were
most difficult).
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2000) (limiting liability of a cardholder for
unauthorized credit card use to fifty dollars).
144. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 30 (statement of Beth Givens,
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (explaining that time and effort required to
restore credit history can be frustrating); see also Margaret Mannix, Getting Serious
About Identity Theft, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 8, 1999, at 88 (explaining that
despite the FTC clearinghouse, the burden of clearing credit history is still on the
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cases reported that it took an average of 175 hours and $808 in out145
of-pocket expenses to remedy the effects of consumer identity theft.
Victims suffer from loss of time and money, as well as stress, anxiety,
146
embarrassment, and frustration.
As Adelaide Andrews
experienced, victims are continuously hounded by collection
147
agencies and are refused credit because of the work of an imposter.
Besides the emotional trauma associated with a violation of privacy,
victims face two primary burdens in their quest to rebuild their credit
histories:
the statute of limitations for actions against credit
reporting agencies and the inefficient procedures of the credit
148
industry.
A.

Burdens Imposed Through the Legal System

By ruling that the “text and structure” of the FCRA would not allow
149
the courts to imply a discovery rule, the Supreme Court disregarded
150
the new reality of identity theft and the plight of the victim.
Considering the recent rise in identity theft, Congress should revisit
the statute of limitations issue in the FCRA and make it better reflect
151
the true reality victims face. The arguments in favor of applying the
violation occurrence rule to run the statute of limitations ignore the
152
unique nature of identity theft, where many identity theft victims
victim).
145. See NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 1 (explaining the findings of a study,
conducted by CALPIRG and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, on the obstacles victims
face when trying to resolve identity theft cases).
146. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 32 (statement of Beth Givens,
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (stating that victims suffer anxiety and
frustration because it can take years to restore their good credit history).
147. See Martha Sabol, The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 Do
Individual Victims Finally Get Their Day in Court?, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 165, 167-68
(1999) (describing the difficult and humiliating process of rectifying a credit
history).
148. See Morphy, supra note 17 (explaining that the statute of limitations and the
poor procedures designed by the credit industry make a victim’s recovery difficult);
see also Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (recognizing the additional burden the
statute of limitations decision creates for an already difficult and lengthy process of
rectifying an erroneously negative credit history).
149. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (concluding that the text
and structure of § 1681p “evince Congress’ intent to preclude judicial implication of
a discovery rule”).
150. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 1011, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the credit reporting agencies have been
ineffective in combating identity theft or assisting victims).
151. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (advocating an amendment to the
FCRA statute of limitations).
152. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 12,
TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that because identity theft victims do not learn of the
crime for years, it would be unreasonable for the statute of limitations to begin
running at the time of violation).
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may not know the statute of limitations has started to run.
Although forty-five percent of victims discover the identity theft
within a month, March 2001 data reported that twenty percent of
victims do not realize their identities have been stolen until two years
154
after it occurs. On average, it takes 12.5 months from the time an
155
Upon notification of
identity is stolen for the victim to realize it.
identity theft, it then takes victims an average of two years to clear a
156
credit history. In response to this data, TRW argued that the “vast
majority” of identity theft victims discover their injuries before the
157
statute of limitations has run out.
However, the purpose of the
FCRA as a consumer protection statute will be thwarted if any
consumers lose their rights to hold a credit reporting agency liable
158
for improper disclosures.
Many victims will also lose their opportunity to recover damages
from a credit reporting agency for improper disclosures because,
even if they discover the violation within the two-year window, they
will not be able to file a claim before the statute of limitations
159
Andrews argued that because the FCRA is not a strict
expires.
liability statute, it can take nearly two years to gather the information
153. See id. (explaining that it would be an injustice for the statute of limitations to
run before victims realize their identities have been stolen).
154. See FTC, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM COMPLAINT DATA: FIGURES AND TRENDS ON
IDENTITY THEFT, NOVEMBER 1999 THROUGH JUNE 2001 4 (2001) [hereinafter JUNE 2001
DATA] (providing percentages of identity theft victims and the corresponding length
of time it takes before the theft was discovered and stating that almost half of victims
discover the injury within a month); MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at Figure 8
(showing that twenty percent of victims learn of the problem two years after it occurs,
which is significant compared to the forty-five percent who discover their identity
theft within a month); see also FCRA Statute of Limitations Begins to Run at Time of
Identity Theft, 38 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS 16, Nov. 27, 2001, at 5 (reviewing the oral
arguments at the Supreme Court in which Andrews’ attorney stated that twenty
percent of victims do not find out about the theft within two years).
155. JUNE 2001 DATA, supra note 154, at Figure 8; see MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note
32, at Figure 8 (stating that the average number of months between occurrence and
discovery is fifteen months); see also Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, Identity Theft: The Growing Problem of Wrongful Criminal
Records, Presentation at the SEARCH National Conference on Privacy, Technology
and Criminal Justice Information (June 1, 2000) [hereinafter SEARCH Presentation]
(explaining that it takes an average of fourteen months to detect an identity theft),
available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/wcr.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2002).
156. SEARCH Presentation, supra note 155.
157. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 14-15, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the
traditional statute of limitations is adequate because most victims discover the injury
within two years).
158. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (arguing that the statute of limitations
on the FCRA should reflect the overall purpose of the statute, which is to advance
efficiency in the banking and financial system and protect consumer privacy).
159. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 10,
TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that a victim has to “determine what transpired” and
wait months to receive records from creditors concerning the fraudulent accounts).
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160

necessary to bring a suit.
Since the FCRA requires a showing of
negligence, the discovery of an inaccuracy alone is not sufficient to
161
bring a suit against a credit reporting agency. As Andrews argued,
filing a claim also requires an examination into the legal standard of
162
care to determine whether the defendant was negligent.
Therefore, a claim can take a substantial amount of time to prepare
163
in order to avoid Rule ll sanctions. The initial purpose of the FCRA
was to protect consumers by requiring procedures to maintain
164
Applying the violation occurrence rule
accuracy of credit reports.
contradicts this consumer protection purpose because in many cases
it can take the full two years to discover an identity theft or to file a
165
claim.
The Court’s statutory construction analysis could also be
166
challenged in light of the new crisis of identity theft.
As Andrews
167
argued, § 1681p could be read to incorporate the discovery rule.
Section 1681p begins running the statute of limitations when “liability
168
arises.”
Relying on the common definition of “arise,” Andrews
argued that liability did not manifest itself until the victim became
169
aware of the theft.
TRW, on the other hand, argued that
160. See Respondent’s Brief at 42-43, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining it can take
two years from the time a victim discovers the identity theft for a victim to be
sufficiently informed to bring a valid claim).
161. See id. at 43 (explaining that an examination into negligence standards, once
the theft has been discovered, is necessary to avoid a frivolous lawsuit).
162. See id. at 43 n.30 (explaining that obtaining information on the standard of
care is difficult because the credit industry is large and information is difficult to
obtain).
163. See id. (arguing that the plaintiff would need two years to gather information
and construct a well-informed lawsuit); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring sanctions for
frivolous lawsuits that are not well grounded in fact or law). But see Petitioner’s Reply
Brief at 15, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that respondent failed to explain why it
would take so long to file suit).
164. See Respondent’s Brief at 13, TRW (No. 00-1045) (quoting Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965) in which the Court emphasized the
importance of considering the underlying purpose of a statute when interpreting a
statute of limitations).
165. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 13,
TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that the violation occurrence rule would immunize
credit reporting agencies from liability); see also Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6
(explaining that the goal of protecting consumers would be better served by
beginning the statute of limitations at the time of discovery).
166. See Respondent’s Brief at 13, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the language
of § 1681p could be read to apply the discovery rule).
167. See id. (proposing that if the common meaning of the word “arises” is applied
to § 1681p, the statute expressly provides for the discovery accrual rule).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2000).
169. See Respondent’s Brief at 13, TRW (No. 00-1045) (applying the common
definition of “arise” to the language of § 1681p and arguing that not a single element
of TRW’s liability “sprang up, came into notice, came up, or presented itself before
May 31, 1995, when she first discovered any credit problem”). But see Petitioner’s
Brief at 15-16, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the liability arises at the time of the
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traditionally a statute of limitations would begin when the plaintiff
170
Since the cause of action is
has a complete cause of action.
complete and the credit reporting agency becomes liable at the
moment it makes an improper disclosure, the liability “arises” at that
171
point. To a victim of identity theft, however, the cause of action is
not complete until the victim realizes a violation has occurred, which
172
will be longer than two years in many cases.
The credit reporting agencies claim that the language of other
FCRA statutory provisions, namely the “notice” and “access”
provisions, are consistent with and support the application of a
173
violation occurrence rule.
The “notice” provision of the FCRA
requires a creditor to inform the consumer promptly when any
adverse action is taken and also identify the reporting agency that
174
took such an action.
The “access” provision requires a credit
reporting agency to provide any information needed by the
175
consumer to correct the improper disclosure.
Therefore, the
agencies argued, a plaintiff is well aware of the time the statute of
limitations begins to run against a credit reporting agency, which
176
makes a discovery rule unnecessary.

initial improper disclosure because the FCRA provisions are violated at that time).
170. See Petitioner’s Brief at 14, TRW (No. 00-1045) (defining the traditional
commencement rule, which begins the tolling of the statute of limitations once a
person has been injured, regardless of whether the injury has been discovered).
171. See id. at 16 (explaining that at the time of the initial improper disclosure, the
consumer’s privacy is invaded, the cause of action is complete, and the credit
reporting agency becomes liable).
172. See Respondent’s Brief at 14, TRW (No. 00-1045) (illustrating how allowing
the statute of limitations to run before the victim is aware of the identity theft and,
thus, unable to bring an action is harsh and unreasonable).
173. See Petitioner’s Brief at 26, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing on behalf of credit
reporting agencies that a discovery rule would conflict with other provisions of the
FCRA and the overall statutory scheme). But see Respondent’s Brief at 40, TRW (No.
00-1045) (arguing that the notice and access provisions are ineffective).
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (2000) (providing that “if any person takes any
adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any
information contained in a consumer report, the person shall—(1) provide . . .
notice of the adverse action to the consumer” and (2) provide the name of the
consumer reporting agency that furnished the report).
175. See id. § 1681g(a)(1) (stating that “[e]very consumer reporting agency shall,
upon request . . . clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer: (1) all information
in the consumer’s file at the time of the request . . . .”); see also Petitioner’s Brief at
27, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the access provision gives consumers the means
to identify improper disclosures).
176. See Petitioner’s Brief at 27-28, TRW (No. 00-1045) (asserting that the
provisions make the discovery rule inapplicable because they allow victims to discover
inaccuracies in a timely fashion but also admitting that because the Act does not
require notification for a request for an ordinary credit report, the Act does not
automatically notify the consumer of every potential disclosure).
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This argument, however, fails to take into account the techniques
177
The notice provision does not adequately
identity thieves use.
protect an identity theft victim because imposters usually submit a
178
change of address immediately after applying for credit. Therefore,
notice of adverse action will be sent to the imposter’s address or some
179
Because a credit reporting agency will
other fraudulent address.
usually accept a change of address without question, the victim will
180
not receive notice of any adverse action.
For example, TRW
committed four privacy violations before Andrews became aware of
181
them.
Andrews realized the violations only when she tried to
182
refinance her home, not through any notification from TRW.
The access provision also fails to sufficiently protect a possible
183
victim.
This provision only requires a credit reporting agency to
disclose information when there is reason to suspect an improper
184
disclosure. With identity theft, however, the victim has no reason to
suspect an improper disclosure until after much time has elapsed and
185
when the statute of limitations may have run.
The application of the violation occurrence rule in identity theft
cases under the FCRA is further inappropriate because the potential
186
plaintiffs have become victims through no fault of their own.
In
other cases, the Supreme Court applied the injury discovery rule
187
when the plaintiff was unaware of the injury for some time.
In
177. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 15,
TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that an imposter often changes the address on
accounts, preventing the victim from receiving notice).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see also Eric Rich, Fraud Made Easy: The Credit Industry Does Little to Protect
Consumers From Identity Theft, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 18, 2001, at A8 (reporting
that credit bureaus are not required to verify a change of address). If credit bureaus
sent a confirmation of change of address, fraud could be prevented. Id.
181. See Respondent’s Brief at 41, TRW (No. 00-1045) (noting that Andrews
received no notice and was only made aware of the privacy violations ten months
after the first violation).
182. See id. (explaining that only the Imposter received the notifications from the
reporting agency because the Imposter had changed the address when opening the
fraudulent accounts).
183. Id.
184. See id. (explaining that a consumer will request information and their credit
file once there is reason to believe there has been an improper disclosure).
185. See id. at 42 (explaining that although identity theft victims are vigilant about
obtaining records when they know their identities have been stolen, most will not
have the knowledge that they should be suspicious until well after the violation
occurred).
186. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 12 (statement of Maureen
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that “[w]e were thrown into a financial quagmire
through no carelessness on our part.”).
187. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 167 (1949) (applying the injury
discovery rule in a workers compensation case because the plaintiff could not have
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188

Holmberg v. Armbrecht, the Court applied the discovery rule to a case
189
The Court specifically stated “that where a plaintiff has
of fraud.
been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of it without any
fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute
190
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.’”
191
In Urie v. Thompson, the Court examined whether the three-year
statute of limitations in the Federal Employer’s Liability Act barred
Urie’s claim for compensation for work-related silicosis, a pulmonary
192
disease.
The Court stated that it was unlikely that “the humane
legislative plan intended such consequences to attach to blameless
193
ignorance.”
Similarly, in cases of medical malpractice, the Court
has endorsed the injury discovery rule because a plaintiff often will
not learn of the injury until some time after it occurs, despite any
194
diligence the plaintiff used.
195
a veteran brought a medical
In United States v. Kubrick,
malpractice claim against a Veteran’s Administration hospital under
196
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The Court held that the two-year
statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff knows of the existence
197
and cause of his injury. The statute of limitations is tolled until the
198
The Court
plaintiff discovers that he may have a legal claim.
distinguished between instances where a plaintiff’s injury is
unknowable and the facts pertaining to causation are under the
known about his injury).
188. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
189. See id. at 397 (applying the discovery rule in a case in which the plaintiff sued
shareholders and later discovered that one shareholder had concealed his ownership
interests). The Court applied the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for
an action against the fraudulent shareholder based on equity principles. Id.
190. Id. (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874)).
191. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
192. See id. at 169 (rejecting defendant’s claim that Urie’s case should be barred
by the statute of limitations because Urie could have contracted the disease as early
as 1910).
193. Id. at 170.
194. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122-24 (1979) (applying discovery
rule in a case of medical malpractice); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae the FTC at 25,
TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that in some cases the plaintiff will not learn of an
injury until well after it is inflicted and sometimes diligence may be fruitless).
195. 444 U.S. at 111.
196. See id. at 113 (explaining that Kubrick sued under the Federal Torts Claim
Act for loss of hearing he experienced after surgery at a Veteran’s Administration
hospital); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000) (barring any claim against the U.S.
unless it is presented within “two years after such claim accrues” to the appropriate
federal agency).
197. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122 (holding that a plaintiff who knows of the facts
and is aware of his injury will not benefit from a longer statute of limitations because
it is his responsibility to inquire whether the facts establish a legal claim).
198. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff who knows he has been injured is no
longer at the mercy of the defendants).
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control of the defendant, and instances in which a plaintiff knows of
199
his injury but not his legal rights. In the latter, all the plaintiff must
200
do is inquire as to whether he has a cause of action. In Kubrick, the
plaintiff knew of his injury, but did not know that he could have
201
made a legal claim for medical malpractice.
Because he only
needed to inquire about his legal rights, the court would not allow
202
Kubrick to benefit from a longer statute of limitations.
The
plaintiff’s discovery of the facts of his injury began the running of the
203
statute of limitations. Although Kubrick was not allowed to benefit
from a longer statute of limitations, the court did not rule out the
possibility that the discovery rule could be applied in other cases
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act where the claimant did
204
not possess the relevant facts about the injury.
In these cases, the Acts under which the plaintiffs brought their
claims were considered “humane” legislation for which it would be
inequitable to run the limitations period from the time the violation
205
of the Act occurred.
The Court in TRW refused to analogize
Andrews’ identity theft to these medical malpractice, disease and
fraud suits, claiming that the FCRA does not cover an area of the law
206
that “cries out” for the discovery rule in the same way.
The new phenomenon of identity theft and the burdens innocent
victims face demonstrate the need to regard the FCRA as “humane”
207
legislation. The plight of an identity theft victim is similar to that of
the plaintiffs in cases of fraud or latent disease because identity theft

199. See id. (stating that “[w]e are unconvinced that for statute of limitations
purposes a plaintiff’s ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his
injury or its cause should receive identical treatment.”).
200. Id.
201. See id. at 123 (explaining that Kubrick only needed to ask doctors whether his
hearing loss was due to the treatment he received for surgery).
202. See id. (describing that the statute of limitations will not wait to run until
plaintiff is aware that the injury was negligently inflicted).
203. See id. (explaining that to excuse the plaintiff from inquiring as to his cause
of action would undermine the purpose of the statute of limitations).
204. Id. at 124.
205. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Court “could not imagine that legislation as ‘humane’ as the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act would bar recovery for latent medical injuries”).
206. See id. (noting that cases where the statute of limitations should be suspended
are limited in character and should be admitted with great caution); see also Rotella v.
Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000) (describing that the “cry for the rule is loudest” in
medical malpractice claims).
207. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 12 (statement of Maureen
Mitchell, victim) (describing that victims suffer financial and emotional trauma
through no fault of their own, and stating that victims need to repeatedly fill out
forms and affidavits that are required by individual merchants in order to prove their
innocence).
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victims are also “blamelessly ignorant” of the injury.
As cases like
Andrews show, identity theft plagues consumers who have been
209
vigilant in keeping their financial situations in good order.
Applying the principle set out in Kubrick, Andrews was aware of
210
neither her injury nor her legal rights.
The defendants and the
Imposter were the only parties that knew of the improper disclosures
211
until Adelaide Andrews applied for a mortgage.
Therefore,
according to the Kubrick rationale, the statute of limitations should
212
not run until Andrews discovered the theft.
In her brief, Andrews emphasized that the discovery rule also has
been applied in cases where plaintiffs seek damages for both physical
213
and economic harms. In an identity theft case, the plaintiff suffers
214
both economic and physical damages. Because the injury discovery
rule is not limited to a specific type of injury or plaintiff, equity
215
commands application of the rule in identity theft cases as well.
The Supreme Court found that the legislative history of the FCRA
216
fails to show that the discovery rule could be implied in § 1681p.
Both TRW and Andrews found language in the legislative history of
217
the FCRA that supported their differing views.
Any arguments
208. See id. (stating that the victim did nothing wrong but still incurred a negative
credit history).
209. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 25 (statement of Michelle Brown,
victim) (“It is astounding that my life long discipline to be a law abiding citizen and
to have the diligence to establish perfect credit was reversed so easily, so quickly,
simply because I represent the perfect victim in another’s eyes.”); May 20, 1998
Hearings, supra note 8, at 19 (statement of David Medine, Associate Director Credit
Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that identity thieves
usually seek to victimize people with good credit history so the scam works).
210. Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (distinguishing plaintiffs who
know they have been injured and those that are unaware of the injury).
211. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (describing how Andrews discovered that
her identity had been stolen when she attempted to refinance the mortgage on her
home).
212. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122 (explaining that where facts are unavailable to
plaintiff, the statute of limitations should be applied differently than where a plaintiff
knows he is injured).
213. See Respondent’s Brief at 19, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339 (1971), stands for the
proposition that a cause of action under the Clayton Act does not accrue until the
plaintiff suffers and feels the effect of an injury).
214. See id. at 7 (describing the economic and physical stress Andrews
experienced, such as the exacerbation of Andrews’ pre-existing rheumatoid
arthritis).
215. See id. at 21 (arguing that the discovery rule has been applied irrespective of
type of plaintiff or injury).
216. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 33 (2001).
217. See Respondent’s Brief at 27, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that congressional
intent to apply the discovery rule can be found because language that applied a
violation occurrence rule was specifically deleted in the final version of the FCRA).
But see Petitioner’s Brief at 36, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that Congress was

SHOUDT.PRINTER THIS ONE.DOC

2002]

12/4/2002 1:35 PM

IDENTITY THEFT

365

based on the legislative history of the FCRA, however, would not be
instructive because identity theft was not a “national crisis” in 1970
218
Considering the relatively new
when the FCRA was enacted.
emergence of identity theft and the attention it has recently received
from Congress, it is evident that reliance on legislative history would
219
be misplaced.
B. Inefficient Procedures in the Credit Reporting Industry Impose
Additional Burdens
The statute of limitations is not the only burden victims of identity
220
theft face. The overall effect of any proposal to assist a victim in the
remediation process will be limited because the credit industry’s
221
The credit
procedures designed to help victims are inefficient.
reporting agencies claim that the solution to identity theft is the
222
more aggressive prosecution of identity thieves.
These agencies,
however, play an integral role in preventing identity theft and in
establishing better procedures to help victims clear their credit
223
history.
Just as Andrews claimed, these entities “have both helped
perpetuate identity theft and have made it difficult for victims to
224
resolve their cases expeditiously.”
The procedures a victim must
aware of the problems of discovering injuries from credit reports and still rejected a
proposal to apply a discovery rule).
218. See Hoar, supra note 9, at *1 (claiming that identity theft is the “crime of the
new millennium”).
219. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 13-14, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that
Congress was not concerned with identity theft in 1970).
220. See Morphy, supra note 17 (explaining that the statute of limitations and the
credit industry’s procedures create obstacles for a victim of identity theft); see generally
IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36 (recounting countless stories of victims who
have been further victimized by the credit industry).
221. See NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 1 (explaining that data shows a
failure of law enforcement, government, and the credit industry to address the
problem); see also Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al.
at 13, TRW (00-1045) (stating that the consumers experience victimization after the
initial fraud by creditors and credit reporting agencies).
222. See Rich, supra note 180, at A8 (explaining that the credit industry opposes
reform); see also Press Release, Associated Credit Bureaus, Credit Reporting Industry
Announces Identity Theft Initiatives (Mar. 14, 2000) (reporting that although the
credit industry will implement voluntary initiatives, the problem will not be solved
unless law enforcement aggressively prosecutes criminals), available at
http://www.cdiaonline.org/mediaroomdocs/IdentityTheftInitiatives.pdf (last visited
Aug. 3, 2002).
223. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 13 (statement of Maureen
Mitchell, victim) (stating that credit reporting agencies and merchants have the
“onus of responsibility”); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 31
(statement of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (arguing that the
credit industry must improve their victim assistance programs).
224. NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 1-2; see Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,
Identity Theft Victim Stories: The Credit Grantor’s Facilitated the Identity Theft Crime (stating
that creditors “facilitate identity theft through their policies and practices”), available
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follow to rectify the mess created by an identity thief can be confusing
225
and time consuming.
When a consumer becomes aware they are a victim of identity
theft, he or she is told to notify, by phone and mail, each of the three
226
credit reporting agencies and all creditors.
Thus, victims must
227
Many
prove their innocence to each company independently.
victims report that this process is particularly aggravating because
“the victim of identity theft is assumed guilty until proven
228
innocent.”
Victims of identity theft also have pointed to a series of
inefficiencies and inconsistencies in reporting fraud to the credit
229
reporting agencies.
First, each credit reporting agency has
different procedures, requiring different information and
230
documentation from victims. Second, the credit reporting agencies
do not communicate effectively, and a fraud alert or suspicious
231
activity on one agency’s report will likely be left out of another.
Third, despite the credit reporting agencies’ obligation to remove
232
inaccurate data, fraudulent accounts often will reappear in a later

at http://www.privacyrights.org/victim18.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2002).
225. See NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 5 (reporting that seventy-eight
percent of respondents indicated loss of time as their main concern stemming from
identity theft).
226. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 9-10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (describing the process of
remedying the effects of identity theft).
227. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 11 (statement of Maureen
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that she sent dozens of affidavits, letters, forms, and
handwriting samples to credit reporting agencies, and needed to prove her
innocence thirty different times to thirty different merchants).
228. Id.; see IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 34 (remarks of Deborah
North, victim) (“[T]hat was the beginning of a long process, a lot of work, and time,
to prove your innocence . . . . You know, normally you’re innocent until proven
guilty, but in this case, it’s the opposite.”).
229. See generally July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 34 (statement of Beth
Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (reviewing the most common
complaint of victims of identity theft); IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at
34-55 (discussing how the procedures used by credit reporting agencies make
recovery difficult).
230. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 95 (remarks of Maxine
Sweed, Experian Information Systems, Inc.) (noting all three agencies have different
processes for handling consumer complaints of fraud); see also Ways and Means
Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Emeka Moneme, victim) (describing one
of her frustrations as the lack of uniformity across the three credit bureaus).
231. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 149 (remarks of Bhavna
Bhagwakar, Volkswagon Financing Co.) (acknowledging that the lack of consistency
between credit reporting agencies’ fraud alerts can lead to mistake in the approval
process).
232. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a)(5)(A)-(C) (2000) (explaining that credit reporting
agencies shall promptly delete inaccurate data and shall maintain procedures to
prevent reappearance).
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credit report, leading to continuous denials of credit for the victim.
Fourth, the credit bureaus do not monitor the number of inquiries
234
made to an account and often cannot readily give the victim the
235
name and address of every company that made such an inquiry.
Creditors’ lack of security at the point of transaction creates an
236
Identity
equally significant burden on the victim of identity theft.
thieves can easily use pre-approved credit cards sent through the mail
237
by banks and creditors.
Moreover, as Adelaide Andrews’ case
proves, many creditors approve transactions despite obvious mistakes
238
made by the imposter.
Fraud alerts also are often ineffective
239
because they are not prominently displayed. Because the alert can
appear on the last page of a report, creditors do not see it and
240
continue to issue credit to the identity thief.
Currently, creditors
233. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Emeka
Moneme, victim) (recounting that she had to overcome the additional problem of
reappearing deleted accounts); NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 7 (explaining
that one roadblock victims complained of was reappearance of fraudulent accounts);
see also IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 117 (remarks of Edmund
Mierzwinski, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (stating that reappearance should
not happen because the 1996 amendments to FCRA created an individual’s private
right of action to sue credit bureaus if they failed to comply with reinvestigation
procedures).
234. See Rich, supra note 180, at A8-A9 (explaining that credit bureaus do not
monitor consumer profiles for obvious signs of identity theft); see also March 7, 2000
Hearings, supra note 24, at 17 (statement of Maureen Mitchell, victim) (stating that
her credit report, reflecting twenty- five inquiries in sixty days, did not send a “red
flag” to the credit reporting agency).
235. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 36 (remarks of Nicole
Robinson, victim) (recalling that only one credit reporting agency was able to
immediately give the victim a list of recent inquiries).
236. See NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 7 (noting that many victims claim
that creditor negligence caused the problem and that “the credit industry had
perpetuated, rather than prevented, the problem”).
237. See Rich, supra note 180, at A8 (explaining that identity thieves steal preapproved credit cards, change the address, and obtain more pre-approved cards at
the new address, which leads to further damage).
238. See Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing
that the commercial credit agency approved credit based on obvious mistakes
submitted by the Imposter, such as misspelling Andrews’ first name); see also Ways and
Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 10 (statement of Nicole Robinson, victim)
(describing the various fraudulent names, addresses, and social security numbers
that her imposter used); March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 19 (statement of
Maureen Mitchell, victim) (explaining that some fraudulent applications contained
blatant errors that should have alerted merchants).
239. NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 14; see Ways and Means Hearings, supra
note 2, at 10 (statement of Nicole Robinson, victim) (stating that some credit was
extended even after fraud alerts were placed on credit reports); March 7, 2000
Hearings, supra note 24, at 15 (statement of Maureen Mitchell, victim)
(recommending that fraud alerts appear on front page of a credit report).
240. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 58 (remarks of Nicole
Robinson, victim) (claiming that fraud alerts were put on her credit report in April,
but the identity thief had opened new accounts in May and June); see also July 12,
2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 30 (statement of Michelle Brown, victim) (stating
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are not liable for disregarding a fraud alert, and the victim must wait
241
to dispute the unauthorized charges. Because the loss from identity
theft is insignificant to creditors, they lack any incentive to pursue
242
identity theft cases.
Finally, a lack of communication with creditors places one of the
243
Obtaining the fraudulent
most significant burdens on victims.
billing statement and credit applications as evidence of the fraud is
244
difficult. While creditors are required to send the victim a fraud
affidavit to verify the fraudulent accounts, this does not always
245
occur.
Not only is it difficult to request and receive a fraud
246
affidavit, but victims must also complete a separate affidavit for each
247
creditor, each of which requires similar information. It is apparent
from victim complaints that even if victims like Adelaide Andrews had
filed their claims within the statute of limitations, they would be
248
further victimized by the credit industry’s lax security procedures.
One can only speculate as to how the needless trauma that Adelaide
Andrews and many other victims suffered, could have been prevented
had the credit industry’s procedures and policies been more secure,
effective, and consumer-friendly.

that fraud alerts should be clearly posted and fines should be imposed on creditors
that disregard the fraud alert).
241. See Rich, supra note 180, at A8 (reporting there is no penalty for ignoring a
fraud alert); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681I (2000) (explaining procedures for disputing
information on a consumer report).
242. See Katherine Millett, Self Preservation to Restore Her Good Name, Elizabeth Knowles
Was Up Against Both an Identity Thief and Official Indifference, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 2001,
(Magazine), at 12 (stating that according to a Ford Motor Credit spokesman, “[f]or
the company to expend its resources on an identity theft case, . . . the case must
involve a big loss, diligent police investigators, a committed prosecutor and a victim
who is willing to devote the time needed to be an effective witness.”).
243. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 11 (statement of Maureen
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that she encountered “answering machine hell” when
contacting creditors).
244. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 49 (remarks of Nicole
Robinson, victim) (describing the difficulties in obtaining fraudulent bills and
affidavits from the creditors); see also Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 14
(statement of Emeke Moneme, victim) (stating that none of the thirteen letters she
has written to creditors have been answered and the fraudulent information remains
on her report).
245. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 50 (remarks of Joe Genera,
victim) (reporting that many creditors have failed to send an affidavit, even though
they are required to do so).
246. See id. (claiming that only five out of fourteen creditors sent him an affidavit).
247. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 47 (question of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (asking if it is possible to draft a single standardized document that would
be accepted by all creditors and credit bureaus).
248. See supra notes 234-240 and accompanying text (describing the credit
reporting agencies’ failure to protect against fraudulent applications).
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IV. THE FTC RESPONSE TO IDENTITY THEFT
Congress and the federal government have not completely ignored
249
the issue of identity theft and its effect on innocent victims.
On
October 30, 1998, President Clinton signed the Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act (“ITADA”) to address the growing
250
problem of identity theft. ITADA amends 18 U.S.C. § 1028 to make
it a federal crime when anyone “knowingly transfers or uses, without
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the
251
intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity.”
While
the criminal code previously addressed fraudulent documents,
ITADA amended federal law to include the theft of identifying
252
information.
Significantly, ITADA recognizes the needs of victims of identity
253
254
theft. First, ITADA entitles victims to restitution. Before ITADA,
only the financial institution that recorded the loss was entitled to
255
256
recovery and restitution; the victim did not have legal standing
249. See, e.g., H.R. 4311—The Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2000: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 3 (2000) (introducing a bill that
would require credit bureaus to establish procedures to assist victims). See generally
GAO REPORT, supra note 27 (studying the prevalence of identity theft); FTC, U.S.
Government’s Central Website on Identity Theft (establishing a website, maintained
by the FTC, providing information for consumers to prevent identity theft and assist
those that are victimized), at http://www.ftc.gov/idtheft (last visited Aug. 3, 2002).
250. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat.
3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2000)); see May 20,
1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 13 (statement of James Bauer, Deputy Assistant
Director, Office of Investigations of the U.S. Secret Service) (explaining that law
enforcement officials consider enactment of ITADA to be “a proactive answer to
what [was] being handled in a reactive manner”); Paul A. Greenberg, Identity Fraud—
The Great E-Commerce Roadblock, ECOMMERCETIMES, July 12, 2001 (reporting that
Lawrence William was the first person tried under ITADA after being charged with
fourteen counts of identity fraud), available at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/
perl/story/11932.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2002).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); see also id. § 1028(d)(3) (defining “means of
identification” as including name, social security number, date of birth, driver’s
license, or identification number).
252. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 13 (statement of James Bauer,
Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Investigations of the U.S. Secret Service)
(explaining before ITADA, “the predicate offense of stealing someone’s identity to
create counterfeit and/or fictitious documents gained little or no attention” and “the
focus had been on the ultimate criminal objective”).
253. See 144 CONG. REC. S9503 (daily ed. July 30, 1998) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl)
(arguing that ITADA recognizes the victim and the crime of identity theft while
previous law did not).
254. S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4 (1998); see also May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8,
at 21 n.47 (statement of David Medine, Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of
Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that ITADA grants consumer victims rights
of restitution for costs incurred in clearing credit history, including civil or
administrative proceedings that may occur).
255. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 20 (statement of David Medine,
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC)
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257

and was entitled to no recovery.
Second, ITADA authorizes the FTC to take a proactive role in
258
Section 5 of ITADA directs the
assisting victims of identity theft.
FTC to establish, not later than one year after the date of enactment,
a Centralized Complaint and Consumer Education Service for
259
Victims of Identity Theft. In particular, ITADA commands the FTC
to establish procedures to “log and acknowledge the receipt of
complaints by individuals who certify that they have a reasonable
belief that one or more of their means of identification have been
260
assumed, stolen or otherwise unlawfully acquired.”
ITADA also
requires the FTC to provide informational materials to identity theft
victims and to refer complaints to appropriate entities, including the
261
three major credit bureaus and law enforcement.
Interestingly, Congress gave the FTC a central role under ITADA,
even though it is a civil agency with no criminal enforcement
262
authority. Because its mission is to promote consumer protection,
263
the FTC, operating through the FTC Act, is authorized to create
(explaining that before ITADA was enacted, the financial institution was considered
the only victim); see also United States v. Karro, 257 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that an upward departure in sentencing under ITADA was appropriate
because of the nonmonetary harm to victims).
256. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 12 (statement of Maureen
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that she and her husband were not treated as true
victims, and could not sue until ITADA was passed).
257. See 143 CONG. REC. S2742 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jon
Kyl) (recounting story of Bob Hartle who spent over $10,000 to clear his name but
was unable to receive restitution for his expense).
258. See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 5,
112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2000))
(requiring the FTC to design a Centralized Complaint and Consumer Education
Service for Victims of Identity Theft); 144 CONG. REC. S9503 (daily ed. July 30, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (explaining that the FTC program provides “real time
relief” to victims); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 2 (stating that before
ITADA was enacted, no federal agency had overall jurisdiction regarding identity
theft); Hoar, supra note 9, at *3 (explaining how the Department of Justice, the FTC,
and other agencies work together to prevent, investigate, and prosecute identity
thieves).
259. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act § 5.
260. Id. § 5(a)(1).
261. Id. § 5(a)(2)-(3).
262. See Summary of Proceedings, National Summit on Identity Theft (Mar. 15-16,
2000) (explaining that the FTC is a civil agency that has been given the responsibility
for identifying and preventing identity theft without criminal enforcement
authority), available at http://www.securityunit.com/other/ natifoc.htm (last visited
Aug. 10, 2002); see also March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 34 n.20 (statement of
Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining most
identity theft cases are addressed through criminal prosecution, but FTC only has
civil authority).
263. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000); see May 20, 1998
Hearings, supra note 8, at 18 (statement of David Medine, Associate Director Credit
Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that the FTCA “provides
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264

this Centralized Complaint and Consumer Education Service.
Additional statutes give the FTC authority to create and enforce rules
relating to specific industries involved in identity theft, such as credit
265
reporting agencies.
Because identity theft is integrally related to
the credit industry and its control over identification materials,
“examining the causes and consequences of identity theft and
exploring potential solutions fall within the scope of the
266
Commission’s mandate.”
Specifically, the FTC’s role is to assist
victims and law enforcement by collecting and sharing information
267
from public and private entities.
A. The FTC Initiatives under the Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act
To satisfy its obligations under ITADA, the FTC established three
268
programs focusing on prevention, protection, and assisting victims.
The goal of the FTC programs is to act as an information
clearinghouse that is designed to:

the Commission with broad law enforcement authority over entities engaged in or
whose business affects commerce”); see also On Line Fraud: Are Consumers Safe?:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Prot., 107th Cong. 20 (2001) [hereinafter May 23, 2001 Hearings]
(statement of Eileen Harrington, Associate Director of Marketing Practices, FTC)
(explaining the FTC’s jurisdiction over the entire economy, including the Internet, is
unique because other federal agencies only have jurisdiction over specific markets or
industries).
264. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 18 (statement of David Medine,
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating
that the mission of the FTC is “to promote the efficient functioning of the
marketplace by protecting consumers from unfair or deceptive acts or practices and
increasing consumer choice by ensuring vigorous competition”).
265. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681u (2000)
(requiring credit bureaus to ensure accuracy of consumer credit reports by
investigating disputed records and limiting disclosure of credit reports to only
permissible purposes); Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (2000)
(requiring creditors to correct billing mistakes and limiting liability for unauthorized
credit card use).
266. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 18 (statement of David Medine,
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC)
(explaining that FTC became involved in identity theft issues in 1996 when it
conducted two public meetings); see also April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 20
(statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC)
(commenting that “[a]s an outgrowth of its broader concern about financial privacy,
the Commission has been involved in the issue of identity theft for some time”).
267. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 21-22 (statement of Jodie
Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that the FTC
will serve “as a central, federal source of information”).
268. See id. (outlining the components of (1) the toll-free telephone hotline,
(2) the identity theft complaint database, and (3) consumer education materials); see
also MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at 6 (describing programs established by FTC
under ITADA).
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1) support criminal law enforcement efforts by collecting data in
one central database and making referrals as appropriate; 2) to
provide consumers with information to help them prevent or
minimize their risk of identity theft; 3) to streamline the resolution
of the credit and financial difficulties consumers may have when
they become victims of identity theft; and 4) to enable analysis of
the extent of, and factors contributing to, identity theft in order to
269
enrich policy discussions.

1.

The identity theft hotline
First, the FTC established an “identity theft hotline” on November
270
1, 1999.
The hotline, 1-877-ID-THEFT, is based on the success of
the FTC’s Consumer Response Center, a call center established in
271
1997 for general consumer complaints.
Consumers who report
identity theft will speak to a counselor who will explain the process of
272
resolving credit issues.
Counselors tell victims to contact the credit reporting agencies, to
obtain copies of their credit reports from each agency, and to request
273
that a fraud alert be placed on their credit report. The counselors
also encourage the victim to call and write each creditor with whom
274
the identity thief has opened an account. Counselors are trained to
explain to victims their rights under the FCRA and the Fair Credit
275
276
Billing Act, and they also advise the victims to file a police report.
The identity theft hotline has been an important resource for
277
consumer victims of identity theft.
At first, it was receiving
278
By July 2000, the hotline had
approximately 445 calls per week.
269. March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 34 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC).
270. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 9-10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (describing how the FTC’s hotline
assists victims, as well as consumers, with resolving and preventing identity theft).
271. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that identity theft
hotline will build on the success of the FTC’s general purpose consumer hotline).
272. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 9-10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (providing details of hotline and
counselor responsibilities by outlining a victim’s legal rights and responsibilities to
identify, resolve, and prevent identity theft).
273. See id. at 10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, FTC) (explaining that when a fraud alert appears on a credit report, the
consumer will be notified every time a credit application is submitted).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. (stating that a police report is the best means of proving identity theft
to a creditor).
277. See generally MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32 (summarizing the data collected
from callers since the hotline was launched).
278. Id.
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received 20,000 calls from potential and actual victims of identity
279
theft. By March 2001, the hotline was receiving over 2,000 calls per
280
week.
2.

The identity theft clearinghouse
Second, the FTC implemented the Identity Theft Data
Clearinghouse (“Clearinghouse”) to satisfy the FTC’s obligation to
281
refer victims to appropriate entities.
The Clearinghouse acts as a
“comprehensive, government-wide repository of information
282
Complaints and reports
collected from victims of identity theft.”
from victims are entered into the database when consumers speak to
283
a counselor on the hotline.
The Clearinghouse is designed to facilitate the communication
284
between the FTC and other agencies involved in identity theft. For
example, Clearinghouse information is incorporated into the
Consumer Sentinel Database, a secure website that forwards FTC
285
information to law enforcement agencies.
Reviewing the
information collected in the Clearinghouse database gives the FTC
and law enforcement the means to identify and track patterns of
286
identity theft and to pinpoint specific practices that facilitate the
279. July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 9 n.5 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC).
280. MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 30, at 2.
281. See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318,
§ 5(a)(3), 112 Stat. 3007, 3010 (1998) (providing that the FTC shall establish
procedures to refer complaints to three consumer reporting agencies and law
enforcement).
282. March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 35 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC).
283. See MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at 1 (showing that by March 2001, the
Clearinghouse had been contacted by and recorded data for 45,593 actual victims of
identity theft); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM COMPLAINT
DATA: FIGURES AND TRENDS IN IDENTITY THEFT, NOVEMBER 1999 THROUGH MAY 2001
Figure 1 (2001) (reporting that by May 2001, the Clearinghouse had recorded almost
60,000 victims).
284. See, e.g., ID Theft: Links and Publications (listing government agencies involved
with identity theft, including: Social Security Administration, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice, and Secret Service), available at
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/info.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002); see April 22,
1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of
Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that Clearinghouse provides a central
database that enables many agencies “to share and manage data so as to more
effectively track down identity thieves and assist consumers”).
285. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 11 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that in July 2000, law
enforcement agencies were given access to the Clearinghouse through their desktop
computers); see also MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at 1 n.1 (noting that more than
1,000 law enforcement officers rely on Consumer Sentinel as an investigative
resource).
286. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 11 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
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287

crime.
The FTC is also exploring ways to obtain and share
information with other agencies, such as the Social Security
288
289
Administration, to further ease the burden on victims. The FTC,
however, is hesitant to share the Clearinghouse database information
290
with private companies.
In an effort to control access to the
personal information contained on the database and to reduce the
risk of the database itself aiding the identity thieves, the FTC plans to
291
limit private companies’ access to the database.
Instead, the FTC
will evaluate the data collected and forward only certain information
292
to specific private industries involved in an identity theft pattern.
3.

Consumer education
Finally, to satisfy its obligation under ITADA, the FTC established a
293
consumer education program. The FTC began its education efforts
by coordinating with public and private organizations that had been
294
researching identity theft and methods of prevention. In February
2000, the FTC issued a Consumer Alert that explained what
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that “[t]he FTC will
continue to comb through the data to spot cases for referral, but has also enabled
others to use the data to ferret out the bad actors.”).
287. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 35 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that “we will look at
whether certain types of transactions or business practices lead to greater
opportunities for the theft of a person’s personal information or facilitate the misuse
of that information once obtained.”).
288. See id. at 36 (explaining that the database will begin including information
obtained from the Social Security Administration because social security numbers are
the means used to steal an identity).
289. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that a call to one agency
should simultaneously inform other agencies of identity theft because a victim of
social security misuse should not have to call all related federal agencies to ensure
that their complaint was handled by appropriate one).
290. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 11 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (claiming that “[t]he Commission
does not envision providing access to the complete database for these private sector
entities.”).
291. See id. (stating that “[u]nfettered access could interfere with law enforcement
efforts”).
292. See id. (explaining that FTC data analysts will forward complaints to
companies they find to be engaged in high risk business practices or are not
responding to consumer complaints).
293. See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318,
§ 5(a)(2), 112 Stat. 3007, 3010 (1998) (requiring the FTC to establish procedures to
“provide informational materials to individuals”); see also April 22, 1999 Hearings,
supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, FTC) (outlining the FTC’s initial plan of consumer education).
294. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that the FTC is working
with government and private groups “to develop unified, comprehensive consumer
education materials for victims of identity theft”).
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295

consumers should do if they become victims of identity theft.
In
February 2001, the FTC published a booklet, entitled ID Theft: When
296
The FTC
Bad Things Happen to Your Good Name.
also educates consumers through its Internet website,
297
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft.
B. The FTC Successes
By outlining the proper steps necessary to prevent additional fraud
and to begin to clear a credit report, the FTC initiatives have eased
some of the burden on consumer victims of identity theft caused by
298
the credit industry.
For example, when the FTC began keeping
data through its identity theft program, only approximately half of
the victims who contacted the FTC had also informed one of the
three credit bureaus, and only half had placed fraud alerts on their
299
300
reports.
Less than half had contacted financial institutions.
Of
301
these, only twelve percent had also sent written notification.
Finally, only fifty-three percent had contacted their police
302
department.
The FTC “minimizes the risk of further harm” by
encouraging victims to complete the process and to contact entities
that they may not have known were involved, including credit
303
bureaus and their local police department.
C. The FTC Prevention Efforts
The FTC also has made significant progress in protecting
consumer privacy by limiting the credit reporting agencies’ ability to
295. See FTC Consumer Alert: Identity Crisis—What to Do If Your Identity Is
Stolen (Feb. 2000) (describing steps for a victim to take to identify, resolve, and
prevent identity theft), available at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft (last visited
Aug. 3, 2002).
296. See generally FTC, ID THEFT: WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO YOUR GOOD NAME
(2001) (explaining general information on identity theft prevention).
297. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that the website has
received more than 108,000 hits since it was launched in November 1999).
298. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 13 (statement of Maureen
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that information she received from the FTC was
valuable because there were government bureaus she would not have known to
notify).
299. See MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at 5 (reporting that only fifty-two
percent of victims had notified any of the credit bureaus).
300. See id. (noting that forty-nine percent of victims had contacted the financial
institutions involved).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See id. (reporting that the Hotline counselors explain what steps victims need
to take to prevent further harm because many victims do not know what to do when
their identity has been stolen).
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disclose personal identifying information to third parties. In Trans
305
Union Corp. v. FTC, Trans Union challenged an FTC order that
306
defined target marketing lists as “consumer reports,” which under
the FCRA, would be prohibited from being sold for target marketing
307
purposes. Trans Union’s primary business is to collect information
on individuals from financial institutions and lenders, compile credit
308
reports, and sell the reports to third parties who extend credit.
Trans Union receives information from financial institutions in the
form of “tradelines,” which include a customer’s name, address,
social security number, account type, credit limit, and payment
309
history.
In 1987, Trans Union created its second product line, a target
310
marketing service, which relies on information stored on Trans
311
Each person in the target marketing
Union’s main database.
database has either two tradelines or one tradeline and a confirmed
312
address. The target marketing service generates mailing lists based
313
on consumer information stored in its database. Trans Union sells
these lists to companies that solicit offers to people in certain
314
classes.
The lists contain only names and addresses, but the
304. See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (banning
the sale of target marketing lists because they qualify as “consumer reports,” which
are prohibited under the FCRA); Individual Reference Servs. Group, Inc. v. FTC, 145
F. Supp. 2d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that credit header information is subject to privacy
regulations and the regulations promulgated by the FTC are lawful).
305. 245 F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
306. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2000). FCRA defines consumer report as:
any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer
reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing,
credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or
mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or
in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s
eligibility for credit. . . .
Id.
307. See Trans Union Corp., 245 F.3d at 814-16 (upholding the FTC order banning
the sale of consumer report lists for target marketing purposes).
308. See id. at 812 (explaining that Trans Union receives 1.4 to 1.6 billion records
per month and their database now contains information on 190 million adults).
309. Id.
310. See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 81 F.3d 228, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that
Trans Union diversified and created TransMark, now Trans Union Lists).
311. See Trans Union Corp., 245 F.3d at 812 (describing that MasterFile, the
database used for the target marketing service, is a subset of Trans Union’s consumer
credit database).
312. Id.
313. See id. (explaining that MasterFile uses information in its consumer credit
database to compile lists of people who satisfy certain characteristics).
314. See Trans Union Corp., 81 F.3d at 229 (explaining that Trans Union uses
tradelines to generate a base list, from which it creates additional sub-lists, such as
the “Urban Ethnics” or “EmptyNesters”).
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purchasers know the characteristics of individuals because Trans
Union sorts the database according to the characteristics a certain
315
solicitor requests.
To determine whether target marketing lists were “consumer
reports” under the FCRA, the D.C. Circuit questioned whether the
information “is used or expected to be used . . . for the purpose of
serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for
316
credit,” which is the definition of a consumer report. Trans Union
allows marketers to request lists based on credit limits, loan dates,
317
number of tradelines, and the existence of tradelines.
The court
found that the mere existence of a tradeline is a factor in credit
318
With this evidence, the court held that the
granting decisions.
tradeline information used in creating target marketing lists satisfied
319
the second element of the definition of “consumer report.”
Therefore, the sale of target marketing lists was held impermissible
320
under the FCRA.
This decision has a direct bearing on the
321
With the restriction on target
prevention of identity theft.
marketing, a consumer’s personal information is less accessible,
322
decreasing the potential for misuse by identity thieves.
More recently, consumer privacy advocates made another
important stride in their mission to protect disclosure of personal
323
information and to prevent identity theft. In affirming the district
324
court decision in Individual Reference Services Group (“IRSG”) v. FTC,
the D.C. Circuit held that all the information a credit reporting
agency obtains and uses is subject to the new Gramm-Leach-Bliley
315. See Trans Union Corp., 245 F.3d at 812 (explaining that purchasers of lists
know that every individual on a list satisfies certain characteristics requested).
316. Id. at 813-14 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2000)).
317. See id. at 815 (stating that the information in these categories are used in
prescreening and credit scoring models).
318. See id. at 816 (explaining that banks consider the existence of a tradeline as a
factor in prescreening or credit models).
319. See id. at 814 (finding that Trans Union’s list contain information that “is
used or expected to be used as a factor in establishing credit eligibility”).
320. See id. (affirming the FTC’s decision that target marketing lists are protected
by the FCRA).
321. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 121 (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group)
(arguing that the Trans Union decision narrowed the ability for identity thieves to
obtain information).
322. See id. at 121-22 (explaining that disclosing personal information led to
information broker web sites that gave identity thieves easy access to information).
323. See Brian Krebs, Court Decision Deals Another Blow to Credit Data Firms,
NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, June 29, 2001 (reporting that the credit reporting
industry will have to comply with new privacy rules), available at 2001 WL 23415895,
at *1.
324. 145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295
F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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325

privacy rules.
In Trans Union, IRSG and Trans Union challenged
the inclusion of “credit header” information in the privacy
regulations implemented under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB
326
Act”).
Trans Union credit reports contain both identifying
information and tradeline information obtained from financial
327
The identifying information, called the “credit
institutions.
header,” consists of a person’s name, address, social security number,
328
and phone number.
Trans Union receives “credit header”
information and sells it to businesses that use the information to
detect fraud, enforce child support orders, and to locate individuals
329
involved in financial crimes.
Before the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, “credit header” information was
330
not considered a consumer report and was not subject to the FCRA.
As a result, “credit header” information could be sold to third parties
331
for any purpose. Despite arguments that the “credit header” does
not have a direct bearing on creditworthiness, the misappropriation
of the basic personal information that is contained in the credit
header caused the identity theft of Adelaide Andrews and many
325. Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 48-50; see also Financial Services Modernization
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 6801(2000)); 16 C.F.R. §§313.10-313.12 (2000) (mandating new privacy
rules that limit the disclosure of nonpublic personal information by financial
institutions, require financial institutions to give notice of their privacy policies,
define conditions under which a third party can receive nonpublic personal
information, and allow consumers to opt-out of sharing personal data kept by
financial institutions).
326. See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 46 (arguing that the privacy regulations are
unconstitutional and unlawful).
327. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 14.
328. Id. at 17; see also Privacy Update: Exam Guidelines, Anti-Spam Bill, Credit Headers,
ID Theft, CBA REPORTS, June 1, 2001 (explaining that credit headers are based on
credit reports but are stripped of financial content and distributed separately from
credit reports), available at 2001 WL 11962810, at *2 .
329. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (describing three
Trans Union products that sell credit header data: Trace, ReTrace, and ID Search);
see also Edmund Sanders, Curb on Sale of Consumer Data Upheld, L.A. TIMES, May 8,
2001, at C1 (quoting a Trans Union spokesman’s statement that the court’s decision
will negatively affect the beneficial uses for selling “credit header” information, such
as finding fugitives, runaways, and parents that owe child support).
330. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (explaining that the
FTC and the credit reporting agencies agree that “credit header” information was
not protected by the FCRA).
331. See id. (explaining that “credit header” information was not subject to the
FCRA because it was not thought to bear on credit worthiness); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b (2000) (prohibiting disclosure of information that is considered a consumer
report, unless it is for a permissible purpose); Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2,
at 121 (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public
Interest Research Group) (arguing that the credit header loophole “allowed credit
bureaus to separate a consumer’s so-called header or identifying information from
the balance of an otherwise strictly regulated credit report and sell it to anyone for
any purpose”).
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332

others.
333
The GLB Act, passed in November 1999, was intended to
334
increase competition among firms in the financial services industry.
Because this increase in competition would lead to increased
accessibility of personal information, the GLB Act required agencies
to promulgate rules describing the conditions under which financial
institutions could disclose “nonpublic personal information” to third
335
parties. The GLB Act defined “nonpublic personal information” as
336
“personally identifiable financial information.” The FTC final rule
further defined “personally identifiable financial information” as “any
information a consumer provides to a financial institution to obtain a
337
financial product or service.”
According to the FTC, “credit
header” information would be included in this definition because it is
given to a credit reporting agency, which the FTC considered to be a
338
financial institution.
Therefore, disclosure of “credit header”
information would be subject to the same strict privacy rules as
339
information obtained by other financial institutions.
First, Trans Union asserted it was not a “financial institution” under
340
the GLB Act. Since the credit reporting services are “closely related
to banking or managing or controlling banks,” the court held that
the credit reporting agencies were “financial institutions” and the

332. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 122-24 (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group)
(stating that the availability of the social security number in credit header
information has aided identity thieves and stalkers).
333. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2000)).
334. See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 46 (describing the purpose of the GLB Act);
Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 17-18 (explaining that the purpose
of the GLB Act is to provide a framework for financial services providers that will
increase product availability to allow domestic providers to compete globally).
335. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 17-18 (describing that
the Act balances consumer’s need for privacy and the desire to increase competition
within the financial sector); see also 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a)-(b) (requiring financial
institutions to give notice of privacy policies and allow a consumer to opt-out of
disclosing their information).
336. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A) (2002).
337. 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(o)(1). See also Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp.
2d at 26 (explaining that the regulations fill the gap in the term’s definition).
338. See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 51 (holding that a credit reporting agency is
a “financial institution” and explaining that the FTC’s interpretation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 6809(4)(A) includes any information provided by a customer to a financial
institution).
339. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (arguing that “credit
header information is improperly subsumed within the ambit of the GLB Act.”).
340. See id. at 32; Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 48 (arguing that the FTC had no
authority over credit reporting agencies because they should not be considered
“financial institutions” under the GLB Act).
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FTC clearly had rulemaking authority over them.
Second, the
consumer reporting agencies claimed the FTC’s definition of
“personally identifiable financial information” as “any information
provided to [a financial institution] to obtain a financial service or
342
product” conflicted with the plain language of the GLB Act. They
argued that information in a “credit header” is not considered
343
“financial” according to the dictionary definition of that term.
Therefore, the FTC definition eliminates the “financial” component
of “personally identifiable financial information” as defined in the
344
statute.
To determine whether the FTC definition was a reasonable
interpretation of the statute, the court applied the two part test
outlined in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
345
Inc. Under Chevron, the court examines whether Congress expressly
346
addressed the question at issue. The court is bound to give effect to
congressional intent if it is clear from the statute or the legislative
347
history. However, if the statute is silent or the congressional intent
is ambiguous, the court considers whether the agency’s interpretation
348
is a permissible construction of the statute.
According to Chevron,
the court will give deference to a reasonable agency interpretation of
349
an ambiguous statutory provision.
Applying the Chevron test, the district court examined the language
of the GLB Act, additional provisions of the GLB Act, and the
350
legislative history.
The district court found that “nonpublic
personal information” was meant to encompass a large list of
information, based on the context in which it was received, “rather
351
than the intrinsic nature of the information itself.”
Although the
341. See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 48-9 (finding that a credit reporting agency
fit the GLB Act’s definition of “financial institution”).
342. See id. at 51 (claiming that if the plain meaning of the statute were applied,
only information related to a consumer’s financial condition would be subject to the
privacy rules); see also 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(o)(1)(i)-(iii) (defining “personal identifiable
financial information”).
343. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 26-7 (citing the
dictionary definition of “financial” and arguing that credit header information
should be removed from the GLB Act privacy rules because it is not “financial”
information).
344. Id.
345. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 51.
346. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 26-29 (applying tools of
statutory construction to the GLB Act to determine the definition of personally
identifiable financial information).
351. Id. at 27.
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legislative history suggested this included “credit header” data, the
353
Because
district court characterized the definition as ambiguous.
the definition of “personal identifiable financial information” was
ambiguous, the court would give deference to the agency’s definition,
354
if it were reasonable. The court held that the FTC had justified its
inclusion of “credit header” information in its definition of
nonpublic personal information when the FTC stated:
financial institutions rely on a broad range of information that they
obtain about consumers, including information such as addresses
and telephone numbers. . . . [I]t would be inappropriate to carve
out certain items of information that a particular financial
institution might rely on when providing a financial product or
355
service.

The district court concluded that the FTC’s interpretation was a
reasonable construction of the statute; therefore, the inclusion of the
“credit header” information in the GLB privacy regulations was
356
justified.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that the FTC’s
definition of “personally identifiable financial information” was
consistent with the broad definition of “financial institution” in the
357
GLB Act.
As a result of this decision, credit reporting agencies are unable to
share “credit header” information because they do not give their
customers notice of their sharing policies with respect to “credit
358
header” information, or notice of the right to opt out of sharing.
Adelaide Andrews’ case illustrates that only basic information, like
352. See id. at 29 (reviewing congressional debates in which two members of
Congress expressly included “credit header” information in the definition of
personal financial information).
353. See id. (stating that “[t]his inclusion of credit header information within the
meaning of ‘financial information’ during debates in both Houses of Congress
reinforces the finding that the statute cannot be interpreted as argued by plaintiffs
would like, but more fairly should be characterized as ambiguous with respect to that
term.”).
354. See id. at 31 (explaining that under circumstances where Congress’ actions
are ambiguous and where an agency shows its regulations were carefully and
reasonably drafted, the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation of the
statute).
355. Id.
356. See id. at 46 (finding that the regulations drafted by the FTC were lawful and
do not breach the plain meaning of the GLB Act or constitute an improper
construction of the statute).
357. See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 51 (reasoning that subjecting “credit
header” information to the privacy rules would be consistent with the Act’s definition
of “financial institution,” which encompasses activities that are not traditionally
considered “financial”).
358. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 121 (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group)
(explaining that the decision will prevent identity theft, at least temporarily).
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that included in a “credit header,” is needed to steal an identity.
With this decision, cases like Adelaide Andrews’ could be less
frequent because the disclosure of one’s basic information would be
360
restricted.
These cases demonstrate the FTC’s commitment to preventing
identity theft and protecting consumers from unwanted disclosure of
361
their personal information. The effect of the decision, however, is
limited because credit reporting agencies could obtain the personal
information from other institutions that are not regulated by the
362
GLB Rules.
In addition, the “credit header” information is only
protected until the financial institutions amend their privacy policies
363
to provide notice of the possibility their information will be shared.
Finally, the restriction on disclosure of information does nothing to
assist consumers who have already had their identities stolen and are
364
burdened with the task of reestablishing their reputation.
V. POSSIBLE AGENCY AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
A. Voluntary Initiatives
Victims of identity theft suggest that a uniform protocol of
procedures would significantly alleviate the burden of restoring their
365
names, reputations, and credit histories. The FTC can use the tools
359. See generally TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (illustrating that a
name and social security number are sufficient to successfully steal a victim’s
identity).
360. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 121 (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group)
(explaining that the decision helps prevent identity theft, but the credit header
loophole should also be closed by statute).
361. See id. (describing the two cases involving the FTC as “a strong victory for
privacy protection”).
362. See Millett, supra note 242, at 13 (explaining that credit reporting agencies
can still sell the same information, but they must obtain it from other sources).
363. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 121 (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group)
(stating that credit header data will only be protected until the financial institutions
amend their privacy policies to give notice that it will be shared and then only those
consumers that opt-out of sharing the information will be protected).
364. See Morphy, supra note 17 (describing the many obstacles an identity theft
victim faces, such as the statute of limitations and the substantial length of time
required to clear an erroneous credit report); see also Millett, supra note 242, at 12
(explaining that the procedure to clear a fraudulent credit history is “like a tennis
match”).
365. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 21 (statement of Maureen
Mitchell, victim) (recommending a “standardized, universally accepted national
protocol for victims of Identity Theft to follow. The bona fide victim should have to
fill out one set of documents containing a notarized affidavit, a police report, a
notarized handwriting sample . . . to be able to submit copies to each merchant.”).
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it has established to develop procedures to relieve some of the
366
Specifically, the FTC
burdens that the credit industry created.
referral service and its authority over identity theft issues can help
streamline the procedures victims of identity theft must endure to
367
regain financial health and rebuild their reputations.
The FTC has debated two voluntary initiatives to facilitate a victim’s
368
process of rebuilding his credit and reputation.
First, the FTC
drafted and recently published a uniform fraud declaration that all
369
This standardized
credit bureaus and all creditors would accept.
declaration form reduces the burden on the victims because they are
no longer required to fill out multiple forms with the same
370
information.
Standardizing the fraud notification process,
however, raises a legitimate concern that the declaration could lead
371
to more identity theft if it fell into a criminal’s hands.
Second, the FTC proposed the “one stop fraud alert” to streamline
372
the fraud alert notification process.
The “one stop fraud alert”
would allow the consumer to call one number to have a fraud alert
placed on their credit report at all of the three credit bureaus,

366. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 181 (remarks of Betsy
Broder, Assistant Director, Division of Planning and Information, FTC) (explaining a
legislative proposal where the FTC would take on the obligation of creating model
protocols, if credit reporting agencies were unsuccessful).
367. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 38 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining the FTC is looking at
ways to streamline the remediation process and citing the benefit to consumers of
making a single phone call to have a fraud alert placed on all three credit reports,
with a copy then mailed to their home).
368. See generally IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36 (discussing the “model
fraud affidavit” and the “one stop fraud alert”); see also FTC, IDENTITY THEFT
WORKSHOP: ONE STOP SHOP BREAKOUT SESSION 13 (Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter
BREAKOUT SESSION] (remarks of Helen Foster, Attorney, Division of Planning and
Information, FTC) (explaining FTC proposals are voluntary initiatives and not
mandated by ITADA).
369. ID THEFT AFFIDAVIT, at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/affidavit.htm (last
visited Aug. 4, 2002); see March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 47 (statement of
Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (responding to
question from Sen. Dianne Feinstein, that “a standardized form is just one measure
that would relieve the burden on identity theft victims”).
370. See 147 CONG. REC. S9079 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (explaining that the new model form, which will be accepted by the three
credit bureaus and many major financial institutions, will substantially decrease the
paperwork burden on victims).
371. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 249 (remarks of Steve
Munson, Deputy Attorney General, State of New Jersey, Division of Criminal Justice)
(proffering that a uniform fraud affidavit must be accompanied by a confidentiality
guarantee if it is to be prevented from falling into the wrong hands).
372. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 47 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining another way to
streamline processes would be to reduce number of phone calls a victim had to
make).
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reducing the number of phone calls a victim must make.
The
Associated Credit Bureaus, the trade association that represents the
credit reporting agencies, has opposed the “one stop fraud alert,”
claiming it will create problems with the consumer’s right, under the
374
FCRA, to dispute records on credit reports.
Credit bureaus fear
liability from consumers who are not made aware that the “one stop
375
call” is only a first step.
Nevertheless, victims agree that the ability to make a single phone
376
call—rather than several—would alleviate some of their burden.
The FTC, rather than the credit reporting agencies, is the
377
appropriate entity to establish a “one call” service. While the FTC
378
does not have access to the credit reporting agencies’ databases, the
tools it has established, such as the Hotline and the role it was given
as a referral service, make it the most logical agency to establish the
379
“one stop fraud alert” outside of the fraud dispute process.
The credit reporting agencies have attempted to address the
burden on identity theft victims through a series of voluntary
380
initiatives.
In 1997, the agencies formed the Individual Reference
373. BREAKOUT SESSION, supra note 368, at 4-5 (remarks of Helen Foster, Attorney,
Division of Planning and Information, FTC).
374. The Associated Credit Bureau has changed its name to Consumer Data
Industry Association. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2000) (explaining the dispute resolution
process for records on credit reports); see also IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note
36, at 160-61 (remarks of Stuart Pratt, Vice President of Government Relations,
Associates Credit Bureaus, Inc.) (stating that “you have begun triggering a series of
duties we have under the law” and explaining how a “one stop fraud alert” outside of
the dispute resolution process may be misleading for consumers who may think
calling a single number will act as the dispute resolution process required under the
FCRA).
375. See BREAKOUT SESSION, supra note 368, at 1 (remarks of Helen Foster,
Attorney, Division of Planning and Information, FTC) (explaining that “one stop
shop” terminology is misleading and FTC envisions a two step process where a fraud
alert first is placed, and second, the credit reporting agencies are contacted); id. at
14 (remarks of Janine Benner, Consumer Associate, California Public Interest
Research Group (“CALPIRG”)) (explaining that it should not be portrayed as a
single number that will solve all identity theft problems).
376. See id. at 15 (remarks of Janine Benner, Consumer Associate, CALPIRG)
(stating that one call would give “reassurance . . . that you do have the fraud alert on
there before you start going through the other tasks”).
377. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 103 (remarks of Helen
Foster, Attorney, Division of Planning and Information, FTC) (explaining that
because credit reporting agencies are competitors, they cannot share information in
the same way as noncompetitors).
378. See BREAKOUT SESSION, supra note 368, at 21 (remarks of Phil McKee, Assistant
Director, Internet Fraud Watch) (arguing that only way to make an outside phone
number work is if the agency had access to credit reporting agencies’ databases,
which is not currently possible).
379. See id. at 15 (remarks of Janine Benner, Consumer Associate, CALPIRG)
(stating that the FTC can act as a facilitator in the process of contacting creditors and
credit reporting agencies).
380. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 73-75 (statement of Stuart Pratt,
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Services Group, which instituted self-regulatory principles for the
381
Associated Credit Bureaus announced their own
credit industry.
382
Each credit reporting agency
voluntary initiatives in March 2000.
383
has also addressed identity theft in some way.
These voluntary
initiatives, however, have been unsuccessful, as social security
numbers and personal information are still being obtained by
384
thieves.
B. Legislative Proposals
On October 4, 2001, Timothy Muris, the new Chairman of the
385
FTC, announced that he would not pursue new privacy legislation.
Instead, he intends to increase the enforcement of existing privacy

Vice President of Government Relations, Associates Credit Bureaus, Inc.) (describing
the ACB efforts to address fraud, including the creation of the Fraud and Security
Task Force, fraud units, and enhanced customer service programs).
381. See id. at 65 (statement of Steven Emmert, Director of Government and
Industry Affairs, Reed Elsevier Inc.) (describing that companies in the IRSG commit
to restricting distribution of non-public information, educating the public about
their databases, and acquiring non-public information from reputable sources).
382. See Press Release, Associated Credit Bureaus, Credit Reporting Industry
Announces Identity Theft Initiatives (Mar. 14, 2000)(outlining six point program to
improve identity theft assistance), available at http://www.acb-credit.com/qspage.
cfm?PageID=116 (last visited July 10, 2001); see also Rich, supra note 180, at A9
(explaining the credit bureaus’ voluntary initiatives and their opposition to reform).
383. See , e.g., Press Release, Trans Union, From Hollywood to Main Street: Trans
Union Helps Victims, Law Enforcement Ward Off Credit Fraud (June 18, 2001)
(discussing Trans Union’s Fraud Victim Assistance Department), available at
http://www.transunion.com/Press/PressReleaseDetails.jsp?id=/releases/press
/data/2001061808331300.xml&page=4 (last visited Aug. 4, 2002); Equifax Consumer
Services (advertising Credit Watch, which allows a consumer to have Equifax monitor
your credit report for a fee), available at http://www.econsumer.equifax.com (last
visited Aug. 4, 2002). See generally EXPERIAN, AN EXPERIAN WHITE PAPER: LIFTING THE
LID OFF IDENTITY THEFT AND TRANSACTION FRAUD 8 (2002) (discussing Experian’s
products that detect fraud).
384. See Rich, supra note 180, at A9 (reporting that FTC supported new legislation
because the self regulatory approach was inadequate and resulted in few changes);
see also Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 122 (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group)
(explaining that IRSG initiatives to restrict access to social security numbers were
unsuccessful because social security numbers can still be purchased on websites).
385. See Timothy Muris, Remarks at The Privacy 2001 Conference (Oct. 4, 2001)
(stating that “[a]t this time, we need more law enforcement, not new laws.”), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002. htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002);
Erika Morphy, FTC Shifts Internet Privacy Stance, ECOMMERCETIMES, Oct. 5, 2001
(noting that the FTC’s new position on privacy is a reversal of the FTC position on
privacy under the Clinton Administration), available at http://www.
ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/13969.html (last visited July 23, 2002); see also K.
Daniel Glover, Which Way Internet Privacy?, FIN. EXECUTIVE, July/Aug. 2001, at 24
(“[P]rivacy lacks a ‘champion’ in either the Bush administration or Congress.”);
Jonathan Krim, FTC Will Not Seek New Privacy Laws, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2001, at E11
(reporting that opponents believe that the new policy ignores five years of studies
that show new legislation is necessary).
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laws.
However, aggressive legislative action requiring the credit
industry to establish more efficient procedures for victims of identity
theft, and creating an incentive to follow those procedures, is
387
essential to make a real impact on a victim’s remediation process.
The FTC’s voluntary initiatives, while alleviating some of the burden
on a victim of identity theft, do not hold the credit industry
388
accountable for its role in the identity theft problem.
1.

Legislation to hold the credit industry accountable
Most of the pending legislation to prevent identity theft limits the
389
display of the social security number.
Other pieces of legislation
390
While
call for the credit header loophole to be closed by statute.
prevention is vital, legislation should also impose an obligation on
the credit industry to establish procedures that facilitate the process
of restoring a victim’s credit history and penalize the industry for
391
failing to do so.
In 2000, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal) introduced the Identity
392
Theft Prevention Act of 2000 as an attempt to empower victims by
addressing the shortcomings of the credit industry and implementing
393
measures to help victims recover.
The bill restricted the
386. See Morphy, supra note 385 (reporting that the FTC plans to increase its
enforcement budget by fifty percent).
387. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 35 (statement of Beth Givens,
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (explaining that laws are needed to create
incentives for the credit industry to change how it operates).
388. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 38 (statement of Jodie Bernstein,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (discussing state legislation that is
aimed at directly assisting victims); 146 CONG. REC. E587 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2000)
(statement of Hon. Darlene Hooley) (advocating for legislation that would impose
fines on creditors for not following procedures to protect privacy).
389. See, e.g., Social Security Number Misuse Prevention Act, S. 848, 107th Cong.
(2001) (prohibiting the sale of a social security number without holder’s consent);
Identity Theft Protection Act, H.R. 220, 107th Cong. (2001) (prohibiting federal or
local agencies from requesting or requiring disclosure of social security numbers or
mandating a national identification number).
390. See, e.g., Social Security Number Privacy and The Identity Theft Prevention
Act of 2001, H.R. 2036, S. 1014, 107th Cong. (2001) (restricting sale of social security
numbers and subjecting the credit header information to the FCRA); Personal
Information Privacy Act of 2001, H.R. 1478, 107th Cong. (2001) (redefining
“consumer report” in the FCRA to exclude identifying information in a local
telephone book so as to ensure credit header information is kept confidential); see
also Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 118 (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group)
(advocating that legislation close the credit header loophole).
391. See, e.g., The Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2000, H.R. 4311, 106th Cong.
(2000) (codifying the fraud alert process and imposing fines on the credit industry
for not recognizing fraud alerts).
392. Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2000, S. 2328, 106th Cong. (2000).
393. See 146 CONG. REC. S1987 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2000) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (seeking to empower victims because they are often treated like
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distribution of identifying information, thereby addressing the plight
394
It also required credit reporting
of an identity theft victim.
395
agencies to investigate discrepancies in a person’s account and to
notify all creditors of a change of address to alert them of possible
396
suspicious activity.
Most significantly, Senate Bill 2328 also
increased the FTC’s authority, allowing the agency to impose fines on
397
creditors that ignore a fraud alert.
Finally, the bill called on the
credit industry to develop model forms and procedures to be used by
398
consumers to inform the credit industry of identity fraud.
In 2001, Senator Feinstein introduced a similar bill, the Identity
399
Theft Prevention Act of 2001, which prevents identity theft and
400
assists victims in restoring their reputations. This bill recognizes the
inadequacies of the current system for identity theft victims and
401
endorses the uniform reporting protocol debated by the FTC.
It
also requires credit card machines to truncate credit card numbers
and to notify consumers when an additional credit card is requested
402
on an existing account.
The bill requires credit bureaus to notify
criminals).
394. See id. (explaining that S. 2328 closes a loophole in FCRA that allows personal
identifying information to be marketed and only sold by allowing disclosure for
permissible purposes).
395. See S. 2328 § 5 (directing the FTC to devise regulations requiring consumer
reporting agencies to investigate discrepancies between the information a consumer
provides and the information already on file).
396. See id. § 3 (requiring credit reporting agencies to submit notification of fraud
when a new address is used on an application for credit); see also 146 CONG. REC.
S1987 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (explaining that the bill improves how
credit card companies monitor requests for new cards and changes of address
because this would alert consumers of potential fraud).
397. See S. 2328 § 4 (requiring creditors to comply with fraud alert procedures); see
also 146 CONG. REC. S1987 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (discussing that the
bill would give the FTC authority to impose fines on creditors that ignore a fraud
alert).
398. See S. 2328 § 10 (directing FTC to establish model forms and standard
procedures, which will assist aggrieved consumers in reporting incidents of identity
theft); see also 146 CONG. REC. S1987 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein)
(explaining that if the credit industry fails to implement measures to assist victims in
notifying creditors of fraud, the FTC can take action).
399. S. 1399, 107th Cong. (2001).
400. See 147 CONG. REC. S9078 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (introducing simple, practical proposals to help victims restore their
financial reputations, and including provisions to make identity theft more difficult).
401. S. 1399 § 2(9)-(10). The Bill states that:
(9) [T]he resources available to identity theft victims are inadequate and
both private sector and federal agencies should provide better and more
sympathetic assistance to such victims; and (10) credit reporting agencies
and issuers of credit should have uniform reporting requirements and
effective fraud alerts to assist identity theft victims in repairing and
protecting their credit.
Id.
402. See id. § 4 (providing that no person shall print more than the last five digits
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creditors of discrepancies between the applicant’s address and the
403
In addition, to assist
address filed with the reporting agency.
404
Senate Bill 1399
victims, the bill codifies the fraud alert process.
requires a credit reporting agency to include a fraud alert upon a
405
customer’s request and to notify creditors of the fraud.
Most
importantly, creditors that fail to comply with a fraud alert will be
406
penalized, and the FTC is authorized to impose fines against
407
creditors who ignore a fraud alert.
408
More recently, the Restore Your Identity Act of 2001, introduced
in the Senate, also recognized the difficulties victims encounter and
the responsibility the credit reporting agencies have in mitigating the
409
harm that identity theft causes.
This bill alleviates the burdens
victims face with creditors by requiring a business entity that possesses
information on an identity theft to disclose that information within
410
ten days of a request from the victim.
This provision provides an
incentive for creditors to respond quickly to victims, reduces the time
that it takes a victim to ascertain what has transpired, and prevents
411
further harm.
The bill also recognizes the standardized fraud
412
affidavit as a legitimate piece of identification.
Finally, the bill
amends the FCRA to include a provision to block information that
results from an identity theft, which would prevent further
413
victimization by collection agencies.
Both Senate Bills 1399 and
1742 are important bills because they include measures to prevent
of a credit card number on any receipt); see also 147 CONG. REC. S9078 (statement of
Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (explaining that truncating credit card numbers would
prevent identity thieves from gaining information and account numbers from
discarded receipts).
403. See S. 1399 § 3(b) (mandating a card issuer to notify a cardholder at both new
and old address when an additional card is ordered and a change of address is
submitted).
404. See id. (requiring credit reporting agencies to use fraud alerts and imposing
penalties for not complying).
405. S. 1399 § 3(h)(1)-(2).
406. Id. § 3(h)(3).
407. 147 CONG. REC. S9078 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
408. S. 1742, 107th Cong. (2001).
409. See S. 1742 § 2(6)-(9) (describing the harm victims face and the responsibility
of the credit reporting agencies in assisting victims to clear the fraudulent reports
and rebuild their credit).
410. Id. § 5(a)(1).
411. See, e.g., Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Emeke
Moneme, victim) (discussing the numerous difficulties she encountered in
contacting creditors in a timely fashion, and stating that by the time she had
completed contacting all the credit reporting agencies, a total of $30,000 in credit
had been used).
412. See S. 1742 § 5(c) (allowing the victim to provide the business entity with a
police report and standardized fraud affidavit as proof of a fraud victim).
413. See id. § 6(e) (requiring that a credit reporting agency block information
identified by the victim so that it cannot be reported).
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identity theft and address the burdens victims face by including
provisions to combat the “endless cycle of victimization” caused by
414
the credit industry.
2.

Legislation to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act
The legislative proposals that would have the most significant
impact on victims of identity theft would amend the FCRA to
415
incorporate an injury discovery rule. As Justice Scalia stated in his
concurrence in the TRW decision, “[t]hese cries, however, are
properly directed not to us, but to Congress, whose job it is to decide
416
how ‘humane’ legislation should be.”
Even if their statutory
construction argument is correct, the Supreme Court’s conclusion
that the FCRA does not cover an area of the law that “cries out” for
an application of the injury discovery rule ignores the prevalence of
417
identity theft and the degree of harm it can cause.
Significantly, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) recently introduced a
418
bill that would make the FCRA more “humane.” The adoption of
an injury discovery rule, proposed in Leahy’s legislation and the
corresponding House bill, would serve important public policy goals
and reinforce the FCRA’s initial purpose to maintain accuracy of
419
credit reports. First, applying an injury discovery rule to the FCRA
would provide an incentive for credit reporting agencies to keep
420
accurate data and to help stop identity thieves.
By refusing to
414. See 147 CONG. REC. S9078 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (describing that S. 1399 helps victims restore their credit histories quickly
and makes it easier to report fraud).
415. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (reporting that Congress should
reconsider the needs of the identity theft victim and extend the discovery rule to
cover more than suits that allege damages from misrepresentation of an FCRA
violation).
416. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 38 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
417. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (urging Congress to “reconsider the
balance between the needs of victims of identity theft and the need for repose by the
credit reporting agencies”).
418. See Protect Victims of Identity Theft Act of 2001, S. 1723, H.R. 3368, 107th
Cong. (2001) (introducing a bill to amend the FCRA to provide that an action can
be brought for damages not later than two years after the date on which the violation
is discovered or should have been discovered through reasonable diligence); see also
147 CONG. REC. S12,006 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(stating that adopting the discovery rule in the FCRA “ensures that consumers have a
fair chance to vindicate their rights”).
419. See Editorial On Credit, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 14, 2001, at 8B (outlining the
need for incentives for the credit industry and noting that without the protection of
the short two year statute of limitation, the credit reporting agencies themselves
would be more likely to actively ensure the accuracy of their data).
420. See id. (reporting that the Supreme Court decision removes the incentive for
credit reporting agencies to implement effective safeguards); see also 147 CONG. REC.
S12,006 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (stating that S. 1723 would give the FCRA
“real teeth to fulfill its mission of protecting the accuracy and privacy of consumer
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extend an injury discovery rule beyond cases in which there is
misrepresentation, the Supreme Court has enabled the credit
421
reporting agencies to avoid liability for many claims. If the statute
were extended and the discovery rule applied, credit reporting
agencies would be exposed to more liability and would maintain
422
consumer records more carefully.
TRW argued, however, that this exposure to liability would increase
423
the “risk of litigating stale claims.” The discovery rule, according to
TRW, would “upset the balance” between the public’s interest in
424
protecting claims and the defendant’s interest in finding repose.
TRW argued that the increased exposure to liability would create
uncertainty for credit reporting agencies and would increase the cost
of doing business by requiring the credit reporting agencies to retain
425
files for a longer period of time.
Allowing defendants to
contemplate a timeframe for liability is certainly a legitimate
objective; however, TRW’s arguments in support of more timely
426
repose are inadequate. To support this assertion, TRW again relied
on the notice and access provisions of the FCRA to prove that
427
existing statutory provisions already adequately protect valid claims.
However, as explained above, these provisions are insufficient to
428
protect valid claims. In addition, considering the technology that is
available to store massive amounts of data, the increase in the cost of
doing business would be less severe than the credit industry

credit information”).
421. See 147 CONG. REC. S12,006 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (explaining
that the statute of limitations could expire before a consumer suspects that their
information has fallen into a criminal’s hands, thereby benefiting the credit
reporting agencies).
422. See Editorial On Credit, supra note 419, at 8B (explaining that a longer statute
of limitations would encourage credit reporting agencies to actively monitor the
accuracy of the reports they compile); see also 147 CONG. REC. S12,006 (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy) (stating that the legislation would encourage credit bureaus to
establish procedures to prevent identity theft).
423. Petitioner’s Brief at 30, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (No. 001045).
424. See id. (stating that “application of the discovery rule tips the balance struck
by a statute of limitations in favor of protecting claims and against repose”).
425. See id. at 28-30 (stating that the industry maintains files on nearly 200 million
consumers and since they are updated monthly, the burden on credit reporting
agencies would be significant).
426. See Respondent’s Brief at 40-47, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001)
(No. 00-1045) (undercutting TRW’s arguments and arguing that TRW overstates the
consumer benefits of the FCRA “notice” and “access” provisions).
427. See Petitioner’s Brief at 31, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the FCRA
requires consumers to be notified of any adverse action taken against them).
428. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (describing the inadequacies of
the notice and access provisions).
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429

anticipates.
Second, an injury discovery rule would provide a mechanism for
430
With the statute of
monitoring the credit reporting agencies.
limitations beginning at the time of the violation, there is virtually no
431
monitor over the industry.
Although the FTC has authority to
enforce the FCRA, its resources are limited and the task is
432
overwhelming.
As advocates of consumer privacy have indicated,
credit reporting agencies lack sufficient incentive to ensure privacy
433
and accuracy because their primary clients are creditors. The credit
grantors themselves also have no incentive to bring an action under
434
the FCRA because they can absorb losses associated with it.
Only the victims of identity theft have an incentive to enforce the
435
FCRA.
Recognizing that accuracy of credit reports is vital to the
health of the economy, Congress amended the FCRA to include a
436
private right of action for damages as an enforcement mechanism.
Compliance with the FCRA, therefore, depends in large part on these
437
private actions.
The Supreme Court’s application of a violation
occurrence rule, however, eliminates this civil remedy that the FCRA
was intended to create, leaving the credit reporting agencies with
438
little regulation.

429. See Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Consumer Advocates et
al. at 18, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (No. 00-1045) (arguing that
personal data is the business, not the burden of the credit reporting industry).
430. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 24-25, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001)
(No. 00-1045) (advancing the argument that the public interest purposes of the
FCRA can only be achieved by use of a discovery rule).
431. See Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Consumer Advocates et
al. at 19-20, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining how the credit reporting agencies are
virtually unregulated and noting that it would take an army of regulators to review
the millions of files maintained by the three major credit reporting agencies).
432. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that because
of the enormous volume of consumer reports issued every year, the FTC simply does
not have the resources to monitor credit reporting agencies effectively).
433. Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Consumer Advocates et al.
at 19-20, TRW (No. 00-1045).
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. See id. at 5-6 (explaining that the FCRA was enacted to regulate the credit
industry because accuracy and privacy of credit reports is vital to a healthy banking
system).
437. See id. at 20 (stating that the FCRA “was designed to be largely self
enforcing”).
438. See id. at 21 (“[I]f petitioner’s position is sustained, the consumer reporting
industry will be permitted to conduct its business, as it has been, with virtually no
concern about possible private enforcement of its statutory duties relating to identity
theft, so long as it can keep the victimized consumer in the dark for up to two
years.”).
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CONCLUSION
Identity theft is becoming an epidemic. Recently, identity theft
accounted for more than forty percent of consumer fraud
439
complaints.
The emotional, financial, and physical impact on
440
victims is devastating. The burdens that the recent Supreme Court
decision creates and the current inadequacies in the credit reporting
industry lead consumers to “cry out” for a reform of the legal and
441
procedural assistance available for identity theft victims.
The FTC
has taken an aggressive approach in meeting its obligations under
442
ITADA and assisting victims.
However, it will not be until
legislation addresses the “humanity” of the FCRA and creates an
incentive for the credit industry to shore up its procedures and
business practices, that victims will be able to fully reclaim their
443
identities.

439. See Identity Theft Topped List of Fraud Complaints Filed By Consumers Last Year, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 2002, at A10 (reporting on the FTC’s findings that the
average identity theft victim incurs over $1,000 rectifying the damage caused by
identity thieves).
440. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (reporting that identity theft
violates its victims and leaves lasting emotional, physical, and financial scars).
441. See supra notes 140-247 and accompanying text (arguing that a discovery rule
triggering the statute of limitations and more consistent and responsible credit
reporting procedures are necessary to ease the burden of a victim of identity theft).
442. See supra notes 268-97 and accompanying text (describing the programs
established by the FTC designed to prevent identity theft and assist the identity theft
victim).
443. See supra notes 389-438 and accompanying text (surveying recent legislative
proposals designed to better protect victims and make credit reporting agencies
more accountable).

